Background
Jerry and Jennifer Spence purchased waterfront property in the Village of Sebewaing and obtained soil-erosion, zoning, and building permits to construct a house. After completing excavation and the foundation in 2019, they paused construction because of financial difficulties and the COVID-19 pandemic. Although county personnel repeatedly indicated that the county permits remained active, the Village’s zoning permit expired by ordinance in April 2020 because construction had not been completed within two years.
When the Spences sought a new zoning compliance permit, the Village’s planning commission denied relief over setback concerns, and the Village’s zoning board of appeals later denied their appeal and variance request. The Spences did not appeal that decision to circuit court. They also did not reapply for or administratively challenge the County’s determination that their building and soil-erosion permits had expired. Instead, they filed an original action asserting state constitutional takings, due-process, and fair-treatment claims and seeking damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and superintending control. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied the Spences’ second motion to compel depositions.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the claims against the Village. Reading the complaint as a whole, the court concluded that the Spences sought to overturn the zoning board of appeals’ decision and complete construction under the original permits. Their lawsuit therefore amounted to a de facto appeal and an impermissible collateral attack. Because the statutory deadline for appealing the zoning decision is jurisdictional and the Spences did not timely appeal, the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
The court rejected the argument that Michigan Court Rule 7.122(A)(2) gave the Spences an unrestricted choice between appealing and filing an original action. Although that rule preserves separate complaints in appropriate circumstances, it does not permit a litigant to evade the jurisdictional appeal deadline by relabeling a challenge to a zoning decision. The court also held that the claims against the County were unripe because the Spences neither reapplied for the county permits nor challenged their expiration through the available administrative process. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying further discovery because the Spences failed to identify a material factual dispute or submit the affidavits required to show that additional discovery was necessary.
Key Takeaways
- A complaint seeking relief that would effectively reverse a zoning board of appeals’ decision is treated as an appeal regardless of the labels attached to its claims.
- A property owner cannot avoid the jurisdictional deadline for appealing a zoning decision by later filing takings, due-process, declaratory, or injunctive claims that collaterally attack the same decision.
- As-applied constitutional challenges to land-use decisions are not ripe until the responsible government entity has reached a final decision, which ordinarily requires the owner to pursue available permit and administrative remedies.
- A party seeking discovery before summary disposition must identify the disputed factual issue and provide the required affidavit describing the probable supporting evidence.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that property owners must promptly use the prescribed appellate process when challenging a zoning board’s final decision. Constitutional and damages theories will not preserve an otherwise untimely challenge when the practical objective is reversal of that zoning decision.
It also distinguishes decisions by separate local authorities: pursuing relief from a village zoning board did not establish finality or futility concerning county building and soil-erosion permits. Each agency’s decision and available review process must be addressed before related as-applied constitutional claims become ripe.