Background
After Michelle Kohn ended a long-term romantic relationship with Ryan Diedrich, Diedrich engaged in retaliatory conduct that included sending threatening emails through aliases, posting fake reviews about Kohn’s real estate business, “catfishing” her, forcing his way into her home, pushing her down, damaging property, and continuing to contact her after entry of a protective order.
Diedrich sued Kohn for defamation and tortious interference but dismissed those claims before trial. Kohn pursued counterclaims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, assault, and intrusion upon seclusion. The jury found for Kohn on all five claims and awarded no compensatory damages but $500,000 in total punitive damages. Diedrich sought remittitur or, alternatively, a new trial on punitive damages. The circuit court denied remittitur but granted a new trial limited to punitive damages, analyzing the award under Florida’s remittitur statute and general punitive-damages law.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District held that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard when granting a new trial. Following Marinec v. Progressive Select Insurance, the appellate court explained that a motion for a new trial must be evaluated under the common-law standard governing whether a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or is excessive or inadequate—not under the statutory remittitur framework. Although Diedrich’s motion was imprecise, it sufficiently preserved his request for a new trial.
The court affirmed the denial of remittitur without comment, reversed the order granting a new trial, and remanded for the circuit court to reconsider the new-trial motion under the proper common-law standard. It directed the circuit court to consider Lawnwood Medical Center Inc. v. Sadow but did not decide whether any new trial ultimately granted should be limited to punitive damages.
Judge Smith specially concurred. He agreed that remand was required so the circuit court could apply the common-law standard, but he declined to join the instruction to consider Lawnwood. In his view, Lawnwood had limited application because it addressed a constitutional challenge to punitive damages rather than the Florida common-law standard, and the majority’s broad instruction could invite consideration of arguments the parties had not raised.
Key Takeaways
- A court may not grant a common-law motion for a new trial by analyzing the verdict solely under Florida’s statutory remittitur standard.
- Diedrich’s imprecise motion nevertheless preserved his request for a new trial under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530.
- The Second District left unresolved whether any new trial found appropriate on remand may be limited to punitive damages.
- Judge Smith agreed with remand but disputed the majority’s direction to consider Lawnwood.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces that remittitur and a common-law new trial are distinct forms of relief governed by different standards. Trial courts addressing alternative requests for those remedies must separately apply the governing framework and provide reasons permitting meaningful appellate review.
The special concurrence also identifies a potential limit on the remand: constitutional excessiveness analysis under Lawnwood may be relevant only if the parties properly presented a federal constitutional challenge to the punitive-damages award.