Background
Sheri Speer, a self-represented homeowner in New London, filed a quiet title action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company in October 2021. Her original complaint contained three counts: quiet title under General Statutes § 47-31, a federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim, and a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Speer alleged that Deutsche Bank had issued her a Form 1099 reflecting forgiveness of mortgage debt and claimed a tax deduction for doing so, yet never actually released the mortgage—leaving her with the tax liabilities but without clear title.
The trial court (Goodrow, J.) struck the FDCPA count. Speer then filed a revised complaint containing only the quiet title count, effectively abandoning the CUTPA claim. Deutsche Bank answered by disclaiming all interest in the property, disclosing that it had released the mortgage in June 2019—recorded more than two years before Speer filed suit. Deutsche Bank then moved for judgment and costs under § 47-31(e), which authorizes a court to tax “costs” in favor of a disclaiming defendant. The court granted the motion and later awarded Deutsche Bank $8,377.23 in attorney’s fees. Speer also sought to amend her complaint to revive the CUTPA count and to substitute the mortgage servicer, Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., as the defendant; both requests were denied.
The Court’s Holding
The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the attorney’s fee award but otherwise affirmed. The central question was whether § 47-31(e)—which provides that “costs shall be taxed . . . at the discretion of the court” in favor of a disclaiming defendant—authorizes an award of attorney’s fees. The court held it does not.
The court began with the text of the statute, applying the plain-meaning rule of General Statutes § 1-2z. It found “costs” to be a “term of art having a limited, well-defined legal meaning as statutory allowances to a prevailing party” that does not include attorney’s fees. The court explained that Connecticut adheres to the American rule—parties bear their own litigation expenses absent a contractual or statutory exception—and that exceptions to the American rule, “being in derogation of common law, must be narrowly construed.” Because § 47-31(e) refers only to “costs” without any qualifying language authorizing attorney’s fees, the court declined to read such authority into the statute.
Deutsche Bank had argued that the term “costs” should be understood as it was in 1887 when the quiet title statute was enacted, and that a contemporaneous will-dispute statute used the phrase “expenses and counsel fees” as a component of taxable costs. The court found this argument unconvincing, reasoning that the legislature’s express inclusion of “counsel fees” in the other statute demonstrated it knew how to authorize fee-shifting when it intended to—and chose not to do so in § 47-31(e). The court also distinguished Fengler v. Northwest Connecticut Homes, Inc., 215 Conn. 286 (1990), which addressed a different statute in an unrelated context.
On the remaining claims, the court upheld the denial of Speer’s motion to amend, finding it was within the trial court’s discretion given the late stage of proceedings and the transparent purpose of reviving an abandoned CUTPA count. The denial of party substitution was likewise proper because judgment had already entered and no counts remained to be adjudicated.
Key Takeaways
- Under Connecticut’s quiet title statute, § 47-31(e), a court may tax statutory costs in favor of a disclaiming defendant but may not award attorney’s fees; the term “costs” carries its narrow, well-established legal meaning and does not encompass counsel fees absent express statutory language.
- The American rule governs: statutory exceptions permitting fee-shifting in derogation of common law must be narrowly construed, and courts will not imply attorney-fee authority where the legislature used only the word “costs.”
- A plaintiff who abandons a claim by not including it in a revised complaint cannot later revive it through a motion to amend after the opposing party has moved for judgment on the remaining claim—at that point, the court has discretion to deny the amendment as untimely.
Why It Matters
This decision settles a question of practical importance for Connecticut real estate litigators. Quiet title actions are common in Connecticut, particularly in the aftermath of the mortgage crisis and the ongoing complexities of securitized lending. Defendants who disclaim interest under § 47-31(e) can recover their statutory costs but should not expect attorney’s fee awards. For defendants seeking to shift the full cost of defending a meritless quiet title action, the decision suggests they would need to pursue a separate bad-faith theory or find an independent contractual or statutory basis for fee recovery. The decision also underscores the importance of careful case management for plaintiffs: Speer’s decision to abandon her CUTPA count in the revised complaint, without preserving the ability to replead it, ultimately left her with no viable claims and exposed her to a costs award in favor of the defendant.