Background
Donald and Lena Childs leased a home for their family in a military-housing community at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. They alleged that recurring water intrusion and mold damaged their property and harmed their health, and that landlord San Diego Family Housing, LLC, property manager Lincoln Military Property Management, and remediation contractor InDepth Corporation failed to address the contamination adequately.
The Childs sued in California state court for negligence, nuisance, breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and constructive eviction. San Diego Family Housing and Lincoln removed the case, asserting federal-enclave, federal-officer, and federal-agency jurisdiction. The district court rejected each asserted basis and remanded. After the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, the Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit again affirmed the remand to state court. Because the defendants invoked the federal-officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the court had appellate jurisdiction under § 1447(d) to review the entire remand order. But none of the defendants’ jurisdictional theories established federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
There was no federal-enclave jurisdiction because the defendants produced no evidence that the United States accepted exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the property. Applying Plaquemines, the court clarified that federal-officer removal requires a qualifying federal actor or person “acting under” one, a suit for or relating to an act under color of federal office, and a colorable federal defense; a causal-nexus test improperly conflates the first two requirements. Even under that clarified standard, the defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer because they independently managed the housing, the Navy’s oversight did not amount to the required subjection, guidance, or control, and the dispute presented no significant risk of state-court prejudice to federal operations.
San Diego Family Housing also was not a federal agency. Applying the circuit’s six-factor test, the court emphasized the private managing member’s exclusive management and control, the absence of ongoing federal operational financing, the government’s merely incidental or custodial interest, and the lack of any statute treating the venture as a federal agency.
Key Takeaways
- Invoking § 1442 as one ground for removal permits appellate review of the entire remand order, including other asserted jurisdictional grounds.
- After Plaquemines, federal-officer removal does not require proof that federal duties specifically directed or caused the challenged conduct, but a private defendant must still show that it was “acting under” a federal officer.
- Federal oversight, contractual approval rights, and performance of a task the government might otherwise perform did not make these military-housing operators federal actors or transform their joint venture into a federal agency.
Why It Matters
The opinion revises Ninth Circuit doctrine by replacing its causal-nexus formulation with Plaquemines’ distinct “acting under” and “relating to” inquiries. That clarification broadens the required connection between federal duties and challenged conduct, but it does not eliminate the threshold requirement that a private party genuinely assist a federal officer under a sufficiently close relationship.
The decision also confirms that participation in the Military Housing Privatization Initiative does not automatically move ordinary landlord-tenant disputes into federal court. Contractors seeking removal must establish the statutory requirements with concrete facts, not merely point to a federal contract, regulation, or oversight.