Background
Angela Valencia appealed from a ruling of the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County in her case against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and Ken Edgecombe. Circuit Judge William Thomas entered the ruling under review.
The Third District’s brief per curiam opinion does not describe Valencia’s underlying claims, the evidence, or the precise terms of the trial court’s judgment. Its citation to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c)(6), however, indicates that the appeal concerned the timing of a summary-judgment hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District affirmed the trial court without a written discussion of the case-specific facts. The court relied on Rule 1.510(c)(6), which ordinarily requires a summary-judgment hearing to be scheduled at least ten days after the deadline for serving a response, but expressly permits a different schedule when the parties stipulate or the court orders otherwise.
The court also cited Covey v. Shaffer, 277 So. 3d 694, 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), for its explanation that use of the definite article “the” identifies a particular hearing rather than merely a possible or optional hearing. The opinion does not supply further reasoning or identify which exception or scheduling circumstance applied.
Key Takeaways
- The Third District affirmed the Miami-Dade Circuit Court’s ruling.
- Rule 1.510(c)(6)’s ten-day scheduling requirement allows the parties to stipulate, or the court to order, otherwise.
- The per curiam opinion provides no additional facts or case-specific analysis.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores that the ten-day interval in Florida’s summary-judgment rule is not absolute. Litigants evaluating a hearing schedule must account for any stipulation or court order that changes the rule’s ordinary timing.