Background
The Delaware Division of Family Services obtained emergency custody of the child in May 2024 after the father stipulated to dependency and the Family Court found dependency as to the mother based on the prior involuntary termination of her parental rights to another child and this child’s substance exposure at birth. DFS provided both parents with case plans and pursued reunification. The mother later began a trial reunification, but it ended in April 2025 after she tested positive for Adderall that had not been prescribed to her.
DFS petitioned to terminate both parents’ parental rights. As to the mother, it alleged failure to plan and a prior involuntary termination involving another child. The Family Court found that DFS had not proven failure to plan, concluded that the mother had established a record indicating she was fit to parent this child, and denied termination without reaching the petition against the father. The Office of the Child Advocate appealed, while the mother cross-appealed the finding that DFS had made reasonable reunification efforts. While the appeal was pending, DFS filed a new termination petition based on later developments.
The Court’s Holding
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the mother’s prior involuntary termination satisfied the statutory-ground requirement under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7) by clear and convincing evidence. But the Family Court did not adequately complete the separate best-interests analysis: it identified how the statutory factors weighed but did not balance them, explain the relative weight assigned to them, or expressly determine whether termination was in the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court therefore remanded for a new best-interests determination based on the existing record and any additional admissible evidence submitted with the new petition.
The Supreme Court also held that the Family Court improperly relied on materials outside the record concerning substance-use treatment, recovery, and the distinction between a lapse and a relapse. The parties received neither notice nor an opportunity to challenge those materials, and the resulting error was not harmless because the materials influenced the findings that the mother remained committed to recovery and was fit to parent. The court nevertheless affirmed the determination that DFS made reasonable reunification efforts, reasoning that the totality of the agency’s services was reasonable despite its failure to identify a safety reason for not increasing visitation during one period.
Key Takeaways
- A prior involuntary termination of parental rights to another child can independently establish a statutory ground for termination under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7), but the court must still separately decide whether termination serves the particular child’s best interests.
- A best-interests ruling must do more than identify which statutory factors favor each side; the trial court must weigh the relevant considerations, explain its reasoning, and expressly apply the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
- A court may not resolve disputed factual questions by relying without notice on outside materials that are not in evidence and are not properly subject to judicial notice.
Why It Matters
The order reinforces the analytical separation between statutory grounds for termination and the child-specific best-interests inquiry. Even when a statutory ground is undisputed, parental fitness is only one permissible consideration and cannot replace a reasoned weighing of all relevant best-interests factors.
The decision also cautions Family Court judges against independently researching disputed medical or treatment issues and confirms that reasonable reunification efforts are evaluated from the entire course of services, not from one asserted deficiency viewed in isolation.