Background
In 2014, the Mississippi Department of Human Services filed a complaint in Monroe County Chancery Court to establish Jacoby Lee’s paternity of two children born to Fredrunna Webb. Lee was served with process, appeared at the May 2014 initial hearing, and signed a continuance order—expressly agreeing to jurisdiction—that required genetic testing and set a show-cause hearing for July 15, 2014. Lee did not appear at the July hearing. Under Mississippi Code Annotated § 93-9-9(2), when an alleged father fails to appear after valid notice, and the mother has filed a sworn declaration of paternity, the court shall adjudicate paternity. The chancellor did so, and a wage-withholding order for $200 per month in child support followed.
A decade later, in July 2024, Lee filed a petition to disestablish paternity under Mississippi Code Annotated § 93-9-10—the state’s paternity disestablishment statute enacted in 2012. He attached a DNA test report that excluded him as the biological father of one child but contained no results for the second child. The DNA test had been administered approximately three years before the petition was filed. Lee also omitted the supporting affidavit that § 93-9-10(1)(a) requires—a statement, made under penalty of perjury, that new evidence has come to light since the paternity determination. By the time of the January 2025 hearing, both DHS and Webb had consented in writing to the relief. The chancellor nonetheless denied the petition, stating that the statute compelled denial because Lee had not satisfied its threshold requirements.
Lee moved for reconsideration, raising new arguments: that DHS had never actually scheduled the genetic testing, that the 2014 paternity order was void for improper service, and that the 2014 order did not specify a date and time for genetic testing as required by statute. The chancellor denied reconsideration and Lee appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. The controlling grounds were the two threshold requirements of § 93-9-10 that Lee’s petition failed to satisfy. Section 93-9-10(1)(a) requires the petitioner to submit a sworn affidavit stating that new evidence regarding paternity has come to light since the original determination. Lee’s petition contained no such affidavit. Section 93-9-10(1)(b)(i) requires that any DNA test relied upon be administered within one year of filing the petition. Lee’s DNA results were approximately three years old when he filed. Section 93-9-10(4) is unambiguous: “If the petitioner fails to make the requisite showing required by this section, the court shall deny the petition.” The mandatory “shall” left the chancellor no discretion, regardless of the parties’ consent.
The court also rejected Lee’s challenge to the 2014 paternity proceedings. Lee appeared at the May 2014 hearing and signed the continuance order agreeing to jurisdiction; that appearance and signature waived any defect in service of process under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1). On the argument that the 2014 show-cause order lacked a specific date and time for genetic testing as required by § 93-9-21, the court found that § 93-9-21(1)(a)—the provision requiring dates in genetic-testing orders—applies to administrative orders by DHS, not judicial orders. The applicable provision for judicial orders is § 93-9-21(2), which does not require a date and time but does authorize the court to resolve paternity against the alleged father who fails to submit to testing.
Key Takeaways
- Mississippi Code Annotated § 93-9-10 is a mandatory, strictly construed statute: a paternity disestablishment petition must include (1) a sworn affidavit under § 93-9-10(1)(a) asserting new evidence has emerged, and (2) a DNA test administered within one year of filing under § 93-9-10(1)(b)(i). Failure to satisfy either threshold requires denial—full stop.
- Consent by the mother and DHS to disestablishment does not override the statutory requirements; a chancery court has no discretion to grant relief that the legislature has conditioned on procedural compliance.
- DNA test timing is critical: a petitioner cannot rely on results from a test administered more than one year before filing—new testing must be conducted within the twelve-month window before the petition is filed.
- An alleged father who appears at an initial paternity hearing and signs an order agreeing to personal jurisdiction waives any subsequent challenge to service of process under MRCP 12(h)(1); this waiver can compound a petitioner’s inability to collaterally attack the underlying paternity order.
- The distinction between § 93-9-21(1)(a) (administrative DHS orders requiring specific testing dates) and § 93-9-21(2) (judicial orders, which carry no such date requirement) has significant practical implications for how alleged fathers should respond to court-ordered genetic testing.
Why It Matters
Mississippi’s paternity disestablishment statute, § 93-9-10, was enacted to address situations in which a man adjudicated as a legal father can prove through DNA evidence that he is not the biological father. But the statute’s procedural requirements are strict, and Lee v. DHS illustrates how easily those requirements can be missed—particularly the one-year DNA-test window. A test administered three years before the petition is filed, however accurate, will not satisfy the statute. Practitioners advising clients who want to challenge a paternity determination must ensure that fresh genetic testing is ordered promptly and that the supporting affidavit is prepared before filing; failing to do either means the petition is dead on arrival regardless of what the DNA shows.
The case also serves as a reminder that statutory consent procedures do not always give a court the power to act. Even when DHS and the mother agreed that Lee was not the father of at least one child, the legislature’s choice to condition disestablishment relief on specific procedural compliance meant the chancellor had no authority to grant it. For policy advocates, the case highlights a potential gap in the statute: a petitioner who has compelling DNA evidence but missed the one-year window is left without a clear remedy, even when every interested party supports the correction.