Background
S.M., a minor child, brought abuse claims in Laramie County against Meadowlark Academy Inc. and other individuals, alleging she was abused at the facility. The litigation was complicated by the plaintiff’s procedural status: the case was filed before a conservator had been formally appointed for S.M. After a conservatorship was eventually established, Josiah Moran was appointed conservator in May 2025 and filed a third amended complaint naming him as plaintiff.
While the conservatorship was being sorted out, Meadowlark had filed counterclaims against the plaintiff in November 2024, asserting breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on an alleged pre-litigation oral settlement agreement. “The Conservatorship of S.M.,” the then-named plaintiff, never answered those counterclaims. After a conservator was finally appointed and the third amended complaint filed, Meadowlark requested default from the clerk on May 22, 2025 — the clerk entered it that same day. Meadowlark filed a motion for default judgment on May 30, 2025. Mr. Moran did not file an answer to the counterclaims until June 9, 2025, 190 days after they were made and after both the default and the motion for default judgment had already been filed.
Mr. Moran filed a written “Response in Opposition” to the default request, but the response: did not invoke W.R.C.P. 55(c) or 60(b); did not request that the default be set aside; and contained no legal authority whatsoever. At the default judgment hearing, Mr. Moran’s counsel stated at the outset “we haven’t moved to set aside [the entry of default].” When pressed by the district court as to what “good cause” he was relying on to set aside default, counsel offered brief argument but never cited the governing rules or relevant case law. The district court granted Meadowlark’s motion for default judgment, finding Mr. Moran had failed to articulate any Rule 60(b) grounds or acknowledge the applicable factors. Mr. Moran appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Hill’s opinion holds that Mr. Moran failed to carry his burden of showing good cause to set aside the entry of default, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering default judgment.
To set aside an entry of default under W.R.C.P. 55(c), the moving party must show “good cause,” and the court has held that “good cause” is found in the justifications for relief from final judgment articulated in W.R.C.P. 60(b). The defaulting party bears the burden. In this case, Mr. Moran never identified a Rule 60(b) ground. Even reading his arguments generously as possibly asserting “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1), the court found the claim deficient on its merits: excusable neglect requires an outside force creating unavoidable delay; an erroneous belief about procedural requirements — here, that the conservator had to be formally appointed before answering — does not qualify, particularly when the case was actively proceeding under a scheduling order and Mr. Moran failed to seek clarification or a stay. Similarly, to the extent Mr. Moran was asserting mistake or inadvertence, the court found that the failure to follow “elementary legal procedure” is not the kind of reasonable error that Rule 60(b)(1) was designed to address.
Beyond the articulation problem, Mr. Moran also failed to address the three-factor test Wyoming courts apply once a Rule 60(b) ground is established — whether the opposing party would be prejudiced, whether the defaulting party has a meritorious defense, and whether the defaulting party’s culpable conduct led to the default. He neither identified those factors nor offered argument on them, leaving the district court with nothing to evaluate.
Mr. Moran’s due process argument — that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard — was rejected as both unpreserved (not raised below) and meritless. His counsel was present at the hearing and participated in argument; the fact that Mr. Moran personally did not attend was irrelevant.
Key Takeaways
- A party moving to set aside an entry of default under W.R.C.P. 55(c) must explicitly identify and argue a ground for relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b), and then establish good cause under the three-factor test (prejudice, meritorious defense, culpable conduct); a vague oral request to “set it aside” without citing the governing rules or relevant authority will not suffice.
- An erroneous belief about procedural requirements does not constitute “excusable neglect” under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) when the case is actively proceeding and the party took no steps to seek clarification or relief from the requirement; the standard requires a showing that an outside, uncontrollable force caused the delay.
- Arguments not raised before the district court — including due process claims and arguments based on court rules not invoked below — will generally not be considered on appeal and will not be treated as “fundamental” merely because they have constitutional implications.
- Where a plaintiff has been defaulted on counterclaims, the default judgment resolves the counterclaims but also effectively terminates the plaintiff’s affirmative claims; practitioners handling litigation on behalf of conservatorships should closely monitor all pleadings deadlines from the date counterclaims are filed, not from the date a conservator is formally appointed.
Why It Matters
Moran v. Meadowlark Academy is a cautionary tale about default procedure in complex conservatorship litigation. The 190-day failure to answer counterclaims was not, on its own, fatal — Wyoming courts retain discretion to set aside defaults for good cause. What was fatal was the complete failure to present a legally adequate motion: no citation to W.R.C.P. 55(c) or 60(b), no identification of a Rule 60(b) ground, no application of the three-factor good cause test, and no cogent argument. The district court could not fill those gaps for the litigant, and the Supreme Court affirmed that it was not obligated to.
For Wyoming practitioners, the case reinforces that procedural precision is essential at the default judgment stage. A client facing a default entry needs counsel who will immediately and specifically invoke Rule 55(c) in writing, articulate the Rule 60(b) justification (typically excusable neglect or mistake), and address the three-factor test with evidence and authority. A reactive, ad hoc oral argument — made almost as an afterthought at a hearing nominally about the default judgment motion — will not preserve the right to challenge the default on appeal.