Background
The plaintiff in the underlying action paid a filing fee of ¥36,000 under Article 3(1) of the Act on Costs of Civil Procedure, as it stood before amendment by Act No. 48 of 2022. In May 2024, before the first oral-argument hearing, the plaintiff withdrew the action. That withdrawal triggered the statutory conditions under Article 9(3)(i) for a partial refund of the filing fee upon application.
The appellant was a creditor of that plaintiff. Naming the plaintiff as debtor and the national government as third-party debtor, the appellant obtained an attachment order covering the plaintiff’s claim to a refund under Article 9(3). The order was served on the government in June 2024 and on the debtor in August 2024. Exercising its collection right under Article 155(1) of the Civil Execution Act, the appellant then applied for a ¥18,000 refund.
The lower courts rejected the application. The Tokyo High Court reasoned that the right to claim a refund under Article 9(3) was personal in its exercise and therefore could be exercised only by the person who had paid the fee, not by an attaching creditor.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Tokyo High Court’s decision, vacated the initial rejection, and ordered that ¥18,000 be refunded to the appellant. It held that a refund claim under Article 9(3) is not a right that is exclusively personal in its exercise. Accordingly, a creditor that has attached such a claim may apply for the refund as an exercise of its statutory collection right.
The Court explained that Article 9(3) promotes fairness by allowing part of a court fee to be returned when specified proceedings end at an early stage through a final dismissal or withdrawal. Applying for the refund serves only to obtain an economic benefit; receipt of the refund imposes no corresponding disadvantage on the fee payer. Moreover, once an application is made, the existence of the statutory ground and the amount refundable are determined formally from the case record and other established facts. There was therefore no reason to leave the decision whether to apply solely to the fee payer, nor was it unreasonable for creditors to regard the refund claim, even before a refund decision, as part of the debtor’s attachable assets.
Because an application under Article 9(3) was indispensable to collecting the attached refund claim and did not exceed the permissible scope of collection, the appellant could make that application under Article 155(1). The underlying action satisfied Article 9(3)(i), and the attachment had generated a collection right in the appellant. Justice Junichi Takasu added that courts must assess carefully whether an ancillary act exceeds the purpose of collection, including any harm to the debtor, but emphasized that this application caused the debtor no particular disadvantage.
Key Takeaways
- A statutory claim for a partial refund of a civil filing fee is not exclusively personal to the person who paid the fee.
- A creditor that attaches the refund claim may file the application needed to obtain payment as part of its collection right under Article 155(1) of the Civil Execution Act.
- The authority to take an act needed for collection remains limited: courts must consider whether the act exceeds the purpose of collection or causes substantial prejudice to the debtor.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that a court-fee refund claim can form part of a debtor’s assets available to creditors even before the court formally orders the refund. An attaching creditor is not left dependent on the debtor’s willingness to submit the procedural application required to turn that claim into a payment.
The ruling is nevertheless tied to the character and consequences of the particular act. Unlike termination of a lease or resignation from employment, applying for this refund neither altered an important legal relationship nor materially harmed the debtor. The supplemental opinion cautions against treating every act useful to collection as automatically available to an attaching creditor.