Background
A jury convicted Antoine J. Hoskins of Class 2 felony arson after he set fires in the glove box and center console of Megan Campbell’s Jeep Compass while it was parked in her driveway. The trial court denied his posttrial motion, imposed an extended-term 12-year prison sentence followed by one year of mandatory supervised release, and ordered $1,952.32 in restitution.
Hoskins did not file a postsentencing motion. On appeal, he argued that his sentence was excessive in light of the limited property damage and mitigating circumstances, and that the restitution amount lacked evidentiary support.
The Court’s Holding
The appellate court affirmed the 12-year sentence. The sentence fell within the extended-term range of 3 to 14 years, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by emphasizing the danger posed by fires set inside a vehicle near homes, Hoskins’s extensive felony record, and deterrence. The record also supported the trial court’s treatment of the asserted mitigating factors.
The court rejected Hoskins’s challenge to the restitution amount. The presentence investigation report contained two repair invoices totaling $1,952.32, and the defense did not object to them. But the restitution order was fatally incomplete because the trial court did not consider Hoskins’s ability to pay, specify lump-sum versus installment payments, or set a payment period as required by statute. The court remanded solely for a restitution hearing on those matters.
Key Takeaways
- A within-range extended-term sentence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
- Repair invoices included in an unchallenged presentence report can support a restitution amount.
- A restitution order must address ability to pay, payment method, and the time for payment.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes between proof of a victim’s loss and the separate statutory requirements governing how restitution must be paid. Even where the amount is properly supported, a court must make the required findings and set payment terms.
The order is nonprecedential under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).