Koble Investments v. Marquardt — Wisconsin Supreme Court reverses, holds state consumer debt-collection law does not apply to residential leases and bars tenant damages absent proven pecuniary loss

Case
Koble Investments v. Elicia Marquardt, et al.
Court
Wisconsin Supreme Court
Judge
Rebecca Grassl Bradley (Scott Walker, 2015)
Date Decided
June 5, 2026
Docket No.
No. 2022AP182
Topics
Landlord-Tenant, Consumer Protection, Debt Collection, COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

In March 2020, Governor Tony Evers issued an emergency order imposing a sixty-day moratorium on eviction notices for nonpayment of rent. Koble Investments nonetheless served its tenant, Elicia Marquardt, with a notice terminating her residential lease for nonpayment during that prohibited period. Koble later moved to dismiss its own eviction claim and admitted the notice was served in violation of the moratorium.

Marquardt counterclaimed, alleging Koble violated Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(j) of the Wisconsin Consumer Act (WCA) by attempting to enforce a right it had no legal authority to exercise. She also contended the lease was void and unenforceable under Wis. Stat. § 704.44(10) and Wis. Admin. Code § ATCP 134.08(10) because it contained a provision allowing lease termination for a crime committed in relation to the rental property but omitted the required notice of domestic abuse protections mandated by Wis. Stat. § 704.14. Marquardt’s attorney, James Miller, separately moved to intervene and sought statutory attorney fees contingent on Marquardt’s recovery.

The Marathon County Circuit Court dismissed both counterclaims, concluding the WCA does not apply to residential leases and that the lease was not void because it did not actually authorize eviction of a crime victim. The court of appeals reversed in a published decision, holding for the first time that a residential lease is a “consumer transaction” with an “agreement to defer payment” under the WCA, that the lease was void for omitting the domestic abuse notice, and that Marquardt was entitled to double her rent payments as damages under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5), with attorney fees for Miller.

The Court’s Holding

The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals on both grounds. First, the court held that Wis. Stat. § 427.104 does not apply to a residential lease under which rent is payable on a monthly basis because such a lease is not “an agreement to defer payment.” Under a standard monthly lease, a tenant’s rent obligation accrues one month at a time — no total debt for the full lease term is incurred at signing and then deferred. The court reasoned that an obligation which does not yet exist cannot be deferred, and Wisconsin law itself bars acceleration of rent and limits prepaid rent to one month, further confirming that residential leases cannot operate as installment contracts deferring a lump-sum debt.

The court also grounded its conclusion in fifty-four years of unbroken administrative and judicial practice: no court had ever applied the WCA to a residential lease, the Department of Financial Institutions expressly excludes leasehold interests from the WCA’s definition of a “consumer lease,” and the agency governing residential leasing does not invoke the WCA as authority. The court deemed the court of appeals’ novel expansion of the WCA an interpretive error that would have upset well-settled expectations across the landlord-tenant legal landscape.

On the damages question, the court declined to resolve whether the lease was actually void under § 704.44(10) for omitting the domestic abuse notice. Even assuming voidness, the court held that Marquardt failed to establish any pecuniary loss caused by that violation. A tenant under a void lease becomes a periodic tenant still obligated to pay rent for the premises she occupied, and paying rent in exchange for exclusive occupancy is not a loss. Because no causal link between the alleged statutory violation and any out-of-pocket harm was demonstrated, neither Marquardt nor Attorney Miller could recover damages, costs, or attorney fees under § 100.20(5) or § 425.308.

Key Takeaways

  • The Wisconsin Consumer Act’s debt-collection prohibitions in Wis. Stat. § 427.104 do not extend to standard residential leases — monthly rent obligations accrue period by period and are not “deferred payments” within the meaning of the statute.
  • A residential lease is not an installment contract: under Wisconsin law, no lump-sum rent debt arises at signing, rent cannot be accelerated upon default, and prepaid rent beyond one month must be held as a security deposit — all of which preclude treating the lease as an agreement to defer payment.
  • Even when a lease is void and unenforceable (e.g., for omitting required statutory notices), a tenant must still prove an actual pecuniary loss causally connected to the statutory violation to recover double damages under Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5); the mere fact of having paid rent for premises actually occupied does not establish such a loss.
  • Intervening counsel may recover statutory attorney fees under the WCA or § 100.20(5) only if the underlying client prevails on a qualifying claim; where the client establishes no recovery, the attorney fee claim fails with it.

Why It Matters

This decision definitively closes a significant question of Wisconsin law that had never been addressed in over five decades of WCA enforcement: residential landlord-tenant relationships are governed by Chapter 704 and DATCP regulations, not by the Wisconsin Consumer Act’s debt-collection rules. The court of appeals’ ruling, if left standing, would have exposed Wisconsin landlords to WCA liability — including double damages and attorney fees — whenever they took collection or eviction steps that tenants could characterize as attempts to enforce rights that did not exist, such as during an eviction moratorium. The supreme court’s reversal restores the established boundary between consumer credit law and landlord-tenant law.

The court’s pecuniary-loss holding carries independent significance for tenants and plaintiff-side housing attorneys. It forecloses the theory that a void lease automatically entitles a tenant to recoup all rent paid, regardless of the housing benefit received. Plaintiffs seeking double damages under § 100.20(5) must connect the specific statutory defect to a concrete, out-of-pocket loss — a causation requirement that will limit recovery in cases where the technical lease violation caused no real-world financial harm to the tenant.

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