Background
Charles Nile Mixon carjacked a Taco Bell employee at gunpoint in Bristol, Tennessee, fled across the Virginia border, and was arrested the next day while carrying the stolen handgun. A federal jury convicted him of carjacking, using and brandishing a firearm during that crime, possessing a firearm as a felon, and possessing a stolen firearm.
In a bifurcated second phase conducted under Erlinger v. United States, the jury considered four prior Texas convictions: a 2000 robbery and three burglaries committed during one week in 2013. It found that at least three qualifying felonies occurred on different occasions, triggering the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum. The district court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 377 months.
On appeal, Mixon argued that the federal statutes exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority as applied to his conduct, that his Texas burglaries were not ACCA “violent felonies,” and that the district court should have accepted his stipulation that the 2000 robbery occurred on a separate occasion rather than admitting details of that crime.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Settled circuit precedent foreclosed Mixon’s Commerce Clause challenge because the firearm and vehicle had traveled in interstate commerce. The court also observed that Mixon himself transported both across state lines while fleeing, further connecting his conduct to interstate commerce.
In the principal disputed holding, the majority concluded that burglary under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a), including subsection (a)(3), substantially corresponds to generic burglary and therefore qualifies as an ACCA violent felony. Although subsection (a)(3) does not expressly require intent to commit another crime, the majority read decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as requiring the defendant to form that intent after entering and before committing or attempting the predicate offense. It also treated subsection (a)(3) as encompassing generic remaining-in burglary when the intent forms after entry.
The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by admitting evidence about the 2000 robbery instead of accepting Mixon’s proposed stipulation. The majority declined to extend Old Chief v. United States beyond stipulations to felon status, reasoning that the circumstances of prior offenses can be probative of ACCA’s fact-specific different-occasions inquiry and that bifurcation limited unfair prejudice. Judge Bloomekatz agreed on the Commerce Clause and evidentiary issues but dissented from the ACCA ruling, concluding that the Texas statute permits burglary convictions based on reckless or negligent predicate crimes and is therefore broader than generic burglary.
Key Takeaways
- Texas burglary under § 30.02(a), including subsection (a)(3), categorically qualifies as generic burglary and an ACCA violent felony in the Sixth Circuit.
- Old Chief does not require prosecutors to accept a defendant’s selective stipulation concerning ACCA’s different-occasions element.
- Bifurcating the ACCA occasions inquiry until after conviction can reduce the danger that evidence of prior crimes will prejudice the jury’s determination of the charged offenses.
Why It Matters
The published decision addresses two recurring post-Erlinger questions: which evidence juries may hear when deciding whether ACCA predicates occurred on different occasions, and whether defendants can force the government to accept stipulations that would keep details of prior crimes from the jury. The Sixth Circuit gave trial courts substantial discretion to admit a narrative account of those crimes in a bifurcated proceeding.
The ruling also aligns the Sixth Circuit with the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits in treating Texas burglary as generic burglary under ACCA, despite a dissent arguing that the statute’s text reaches unintentional predicate offenses. That disagreement may remain significant for defendants whose ACCA exposure depends on convictions under Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a).