Background
Sebastian Keitel and Avanlee Okragly are the unmarried parents of a minor child, A.M.O.K. In April 2024, after contentious litigation, the parties filed a stipulated final parenting plan in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, Montana. The plan provided that the child would primarily reside with Okragly, that Keitel would have parenting time on the first weekend of each month, that both parents would have access to the child’s medical information, and that Okragly would amend the child’s birth certificate to add Keitel’s surname. The plan also contained a prevailing-party attorney fees clause covering future litigation to enforce, modify, or interpret its terms.
About six months after the parenting plan was filed, Keitel moved to hold Okragly in contempt on four grounds: (1) intentional interference with his October 2024 parenting time; (2) failure to notify him of the child’s medical appointments; (3) unilateral withdrawal of the child from speech and physical therapy; and (4) failure to amend the birth certificate. At the contempt hearing, Okragly testified and presented evidence on each allegation. Keitel did not appear and presented no witness testimony.
The District Court denied Keitel’s contempt motion on all counts, finding Okragly had been ready and willing to exchange the child, that Keitel had access to medical records through the MyChart portal, and that there was no evidence Okragly had defied medical advice regarding therapy. The court declined to find the birth certificate delay a basis for contempt. Pursuant to the parenting plan’s fee-shifting clause, the court held Okragly was the prevailing party and, after an evidentiary hearing, awarded her $14,880 in attorney fees and costs. Keitel appealed, challenging both the prevailing-party determination and the reasonableness of the fee award.
The Court’s Holding
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order in full. On the prevailing-party issue, the Court held that Keitel’s challenge to the underlying contempt ruling was outside the scope of the appeal because he had failed to timely appeal the contempt order within the 30-day window required by M. R. App. P. 4(5)(a)(i). Because the contempt motion was denied, Okragly was by definition the prevailing party entitled to fees and costs under the parenting plan’s contractual fee-shifting provision.
On the reasonableness of the fee award, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The District Court had conducted an evidentiary hearing, applied the multi-factor test from Plath v. Schonrock, 2003 MT 21, and made specific findings crediting the testimony of Okragly’s attorney, Joseph Raffiani. Raffiani testified that he billed 30.3 hours at $350 per hour and his paralegal billed 28.5 hours at $150 per hour, totaling $14,880, and that entries were limited to work on the contempt matter. Keitel cross-examined Raffiani but neither appeared at the hearing nor submitted independent evidence to rebut the fee claim.
The Court reiterated that attorney testimony constitutes competent evidence of fee reasonableness, citing James Talcott Construction, Inc. v. P&D Land Enterprises, 2006 MT 188, and that expert testimony is not required in all circumstances. Because Keitel failed to offer conflicting evidence, he did not carry his burden of demonstrating the District Court acted arbitrarily or in excess of the bounds of reason.
Key Takeaways
- A stipulated parenting plan is treated as a contract, and clear, unambiguous attorney fee-shifting provisions in such plans are binding on the parties and enforceable by the court.
- A party who fails to timely appeal a contempt ruling cannot collaterally challenge the underlying merits when appealing only the ancillary fee award.
- An attorney’s sworn affidavit and live testimony at an evidentiary hearing constitute competent evidence sufficient to support a fee award; the opposing party bears the burden of presenting rebuttal evidence, and failure to appear or offer any evidence at the fee hearing is fatal to a reasonableness challenge on appeal.
- District courts are afforded wide discretion in assessing attorney fee reasonableness under the Plath factors, and an appellate court will not second-guess credibility determinations made after a hearing.
Why It Matters
This decision underscores the enforceability of contractual fee-shifting clauses in Montana parenting plans and the practical consequences of failing to participate in fee-reasonableness hearings. Family law practitioners should advise clients that contesting a fee award requires affirmative rebuttal evidence — cross-examination alone, without independent witnesses or exhibits, is unlikely to overcome a credible fee affidavit.
The case also serves as a reminder of appellate procedural limits: a party who misses the deadline to appeal a contempt order cannot use a fee appeal as a back door to relitigate the underlying ruling. While issued as a noncitable memorandum opinion under Montana’s internal rules, the decision reflects settled Montana law on attorney fees in family court proceedings and illustrates how those principles play out when one party fails to engage meaningfully at the trial level.