Background
Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services became involved with M.D.B. and her children in 2022 after allegations of educational neglect involving the two oldest children. Although M.D.B. completed an initial prevention plan, the family court continued reviewing the case. In May 2024, the Cabinet filed another dependency, neglect, or abuse petition after M.D.B. tested positive for multiple substances, and the three older children entered foster care. Her youngest child entered Cabinet custody immediately after birth in June 2024, when M.D.B. tested positive for methamphetamine.
The family court later found that M.D.B. had made little progress on her case plan, continued testing positive for drugs, lacked stable housing, inconsistently communicated with the Cabinet, and had limited contact with the children. The Cabinet petitioned to terminate her parental rights in March 2025. Although M.D.B. subsequently completed short-term substance-abuse treatment, parenting classes, began therapy, and became consistent with visitation, she had not completed recommended long-term treatment, obtained suitable housing, or finished her parenting assessment by the November 2025 termination hearing. The family court terminated her parental rights to all four children.
The Court’s Holding
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under KRS 625.090(2)(e) because, for more than six months, M.D.B. had failed or been substantially incapable of providing essential parental care and protection, with no reasonable expectation of improvement. Her substance abuse, refusal to pursue recommended inpatient treatment, housing instability, inconsistent visitation, and failure to complete her case plan supported that finding. Her progress after the termination petition was filed did not make the family court’s contrary assessment clearly erroneous.
The court also concluded that M.D.B.’s lack of housing suitable for four children supported the family court’s finding under KRS 625.090(2)(g), although only one statutory ground was necessary. Substantial evidence likewise supported the determination that termination served each child’s best interests. The youngest child was thriving with the only parental figures she had known, while the three older children were flourishing in foster care despite their close and loving bond with M.D.B. Because the evidence could support either outcome as to the older children, the appellate court deferred to the family court’s weighing of the evidence and credibility determinations.
The court declined to address M.D.B.’s constitutional challenge to the statutory abandonment ground in KRS 625.090(2)(a). The argument was unpreserved, she had not provided the required notice to the Kentucky Attorney General, and termination was independently supported by another statutory ground.
Key Takeaways
- A parent’s late progress after a termination petition is filed does not compel denial of termination when substantial evidence supports a finding that essential problems remain unresolved and improvement is not reasonably expected.
- Only one ground under KRS 625.090(2) is required; the supported finding that M.D.B. failed to provide essential parental care and protection was independently sufficient.
- A strong and loving parent-child bond does not preclude termination when the family court reasonably finds that permanency, safety, and the children’s progress in foster care make termination their best option.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the deference Kentucky appellate courts give family courts in termination cases when factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and the correct statutory framework is applied. Even meaningful recent improvements may not outweigh a prolonged failure to address substance abuse, housing, and parenting needs.
It also underscores two appellate-practice points: a reviewing court need not examine every termination ground once one is adequately supported, and constitutional challenges may be rejected without reaching the merits when they were not preserved and the Attorney General did not receive statutorily required notice.