Background
Miranda Llano and Corey Llano divorced in 2022. Their consent decree gave them joint custody of their child under a rotating 2-2-3 schedule and divided final decision-making authority: Mother controlled religious and extracurricular matters, while Father controlled medical and educational decisions. Even before the decree, Mother had raised concerns that the child might have autism. After the divorce, the child received occupational therapy and evaluations for behavioral, developmental, feeding, and sleep-related concerns. The parents repeatedly disagreed about which evaluations and treatments were necessary and how quickly they should occur.
Mother sought sole custody in 2023, alleging that Father interfered with medical care and resisted an autism evaluation. The family court entered temporary orders addressing therapy and evaluation. An Emory University assessment later found the evidence inconclusive for autism and concluded that the child’s symptoms were better explained by adjustment disorder, ADHD, a learning disorder, autism-spectrum characteristics, and stress from trying to please parents with sharply different approaches. A forensic psychologist observed conduct by Mother that she regarded as alienating, but ultimately recommended continuing joint custody because changing the arrangement would likely worsen the child’s mental-health symptoms.
After trial, the family court denied both parents’ requests for sole custody. It reduced transitions by adopting alternating weeks, required coparenting education and use of OurFamilyWizard, designated Father the primary custodial parent, and gave him final authority over major decisions. It also required continued counseling and restricted the child’s unsupervised access to knives or other pointed objects. Mother appealed the denial of sole custody and several related rulings.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Under South Carolina law, a parent seeking to alter an existing custody arrangement must show a substantial post-decree change affecting the child’s welfare and that the requested custody change serves the child’s best interests. The court stressed that a modification proceeding is not a chance to relitigate circumstances already known when the original decree was entered. Although later evidence validated some of Mother’s concerns, testimony showed that behavioral symptoms existed before the divorce. A diagnosis date did not establish when the underlying condition began.
The record also did not show that awarding Mother sole custody would serve the child’s interests. Most witnesses described two devoted parents with different parenting styles, and the professionals did not recommend ending joint custody. The court characterized Father’s approach to health care as cautious rather than neglectful. His delay in arranging an autism evaluation did not outweigh the Emory report, which supported his concern that conflict between the parents was contributing to the child’s symptoms. Giving Father unified decision-making authority, combined with fewer custody exchanges, reasonably addressed that conflict.
The panel rejected Mother’s argument that the family court improperly considered the child’s preference. South Carolina Code section 63-15-30 requires courts to consider a child’s reasonable preference and assign weight according to age, experience, maturity, judgment, and ability to express a view. The family court gave the child’s wish to remain with both parents only “some” weight and relied on the totality of the circumstances. The panel found that approach proper and, in any event, harmless because the preference was not controlling.
The family court did err in finding that the child’s health had improved since the divorce, but the error was harmless because it was an alternative ground. The Court of Appeals also rejected the contention that joint custody required a different result. Although prior decisions say joint or divided custody should be reserved for exceptional circumstances, sections 63-15-230(B) and (C) permit joint custody and require consideration of all custody options. The child’s best interests remained paramount, and the evidence showed that severing custody with either fit parent could cause harm. Finally, the injunction restricting access to knives sufficiently addressed the asserted safety concerns.
Key Takeaways
- A South Carolina custody-modification claim must rest on a material change occurring after the existing decree; later diagnosis of a condition does not necessarily prove the condition arose later.
- Showing changed circumstances is not enough. The parent seeking modification must also prove that the requested custody arrangement advances the child’s overall best interests.
- A family court must consider a child’s reasonable custody preference, but may give it limited weight based on maturity and the surrounding evidence.
- Reducing exchanges and consolidating decision-making can address harmful parental conflict without eliminating joint custody.
Why It Matters
For South Carolina family-law practitioners, Llano illustrates the evidentiary distinction between a newly documented diagnosis and a genuinely new circumstance. Counsel seeking modification should establish when the operative facts emerged, how they differ from facts considered in the prior decree, and why the specific relief requested—not merely some adjustment—serves the child’s welfare. Medical records should be tied to that timeline rather than offered only as proof that one parent’s concerns were justified.
The opinion also shows the range of remedies available when parental conflict, rather than parental unfitness, is harming a child. A court may preserve joint custody while reducing handoffs, requiring structured communication, ordering coparenting education, and vesting final decisions in one parent. Because the decision is unpublished, it has no precedential value except as allowed by Rule 268(d)(2), SCACR, but its application of existing South Carolina custody principles remains practically instructive.