Background
Care proceedings were brought concerning three girls — F (aged 14), G (nearly 5), and H (3½) — born to Grenadian parents living in London. The family had a history of domestic abuse perpetrated by the father, with the mother repeatedly making and then withdrawing allegations. The mother suffered episodes of acute psychosis triggered by the abuse, resulting in the children being placed in foster care in March 2025 and interim care orders made in April 2025. Following the parents’ separation in late 2025, the mother engaged with the Freedom Programme and stabilised her mental health with medication and community support.
At the final hearing in February and March 2026 before HH Judge Willans at the Family Court at West London, the local authority sought care orders for all three children: long-term foster care for F, and placement orders with a view to adoption by a paternal aunt in Canada for the two younger girls. The parents sought the children’s return to the mother. The children’s guardian supported care orders but opposed the adoption plan, arguing it was premature and that the mother’s capacity to care should first be assessed under a supervised rehabilitation.
HH Judge Willans found that the threshold criteria for orders under s.31 of the Children Act 1989 were met on the basis of domestic abuse, but concluded that the children should be returned to their mother’s care under a two-year supervision order, supported by a non-molestation order against the father, the mother’s sister’s co-residence, stable housing, and ongoing mental health engagement. He dismissed the application for placement orders, finding the proposed adoption in Canada unrealistic and unjustified in comparison to rehabilitation with the mother. The local authority appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal (Baker, Newey, and Peter Jackson LJJ) unanimously refused permission to appeal. Baker LJ, giving the leading judgment, held that the judge’s analysis was thorough, properly structured, and compliant with the requirements for adequate judicial reasoning set out in Re B (A Child) (Adequacy of Reasons) [2022] EWCA Civ 407 and Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5. The judgment’s unconventional style did not render it deficient; it addressed the key issues of domestic abuse, the mother’s mental health, their interaction, and the welfare balancing exercise in a clearly organised and analytical way. The local authority’s contention that the judge had focused only on part of the evidence of historical domestic abuse and thereby distorted his risk assessment was rejected — the court found he had the full history in mind and gave adequate reasons for departing from the professional recommendations.
On the ultra vires supervision order, the Court accepted that the judge had erred in making a two-year order when Schedule 3, paragraph 6(1) of the Children Act 1989 limits an initial supervision order to one year. However, the Court held that this error did not undermine the judge’s analysis or compromise the children’s welfare. Rather than granting permission to appeal and substituting a one-year order, the Court directed the local authority to draw the discrepancy to the judge’s attention so that he could make the necessary amendment to the approved final order, noting that a lawful one-year order already appeared to have been generated automatically by the Family Public Law Portal.
The Court also noted, without resolving, an “interesting question” as to the legal status of an order generated automatically by the court’s digitised system that is correct in law but conflicts with a provision inadvertently included in the judge’s approved order.
Key Takeaways
- An appellate court will not interfere with a first-instance judge’s findings of fact and risk assessment in care proceedings unless compelled to do so; the trial judge who heard four days of evidence was uniquely placed to evaluate credibility and future risk.
- A judgment need not recite all evidence or contain a separate section analysing each witness; provided the judge states that all evidence was considered and the reasoning demonstrates engagement with the key issues, the judgment will satisfy the adequacy standard from Re B [2022] EWCA Civ 407.
- A supervision order made for a period exceeding one year is ultra vires under Schedule 3, paragraph 6(1) of the Children Act 1989; the maximum initial duration is one year, with the possibility of extension on application under paragraph 6(3) up to a total of three years.
- Where a digitised court system automatically generates a legally correct order that conflicts with an erroneous provision in the judge’s approved order, the proper course is to refer the matter back to the judge for correction rather than to treat the ultra vires provision as determinative on appeal.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the high threshold for appellate intervention in child welfare cases where a first-instance judge has conducted a careful, structured analysis and given adequate — if concise — reasons for preferring rehabilitation over adoption or long-term foster care. It underscores that professional recommendations, while weighty, are not determinative, and that a judge who departs from them with explained reasons acts within proper bounds. The case is also a practical reminder that courts and practitioners must be alert to the statutory cap on initial supervision order durations, a detail that none of the parties raised before the judge.
The judgment additionally flags an unresolved issue of procedural significance arising from the increasing digitalisation of court processes: where an automated system generates an order that correctly reflects the law but contradicts the judge’s (erroneous) expressed intention, the legal status of each instrument — and which prevails — remains an open question for future determination.