Background
Derrick Lamar Walker was convicted after a bench trial of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance under section 810.09(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2024). Trial testimony showed that the property’s operations manager asked a Gainesville police officer to warn Walker that he could not return and that Walker subsequently returned twice.
Walker represented himself after a valid Faretta hearing. During that hearing, he asked whether he could request a bench trial, and the court discussed the differences between jury and bench trials as part of its colloquy concerning his waiver of counsel. At two later pretrial hearings, Walker personally confirmed under oath that he continued to want a bench trial.
The Court’s Holding
The First District affirmed the conviction. It held that the trial court properly denied Walker’s motion for judgment of acquittal because testimony from the operations manager and police officer established that Walker returned to the property twice after the officer warned him not to enter.
The court also held that Walker knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. Unlike a defendant who merely remains silent after counsel requests a bench trial, Walker personally and repeatedly requested one after the court explained the relevant differences. The court further concluded that even if the waiver colloquy were deficient, any error was invited because Walker, while representing himself, requested and repeatedly confirmed the bench trial.
Key Takeaways
- Testimony that Walker twice returned after receiving a direct police warning not to enter was sufficient to sustain his trespass conviction.
- An oral jury-trial waiver was valid where the self-represented defendant personally requested a bench trial, received an adequate explanation, and repeatedly confirmed his choice on the record.
- A defendant generally cannot obtain appellate relief from an error he invited, and that doctrine applied to Walker’s conduct while proceeding pro se.
Why It Matters
The decision distinguishes an affirmative, personal request for a bench trial from mere silence following counsel’s purported waiver. It confirms that a colloquy conducted in connection with self-representation may also support a valid oral jury-trial waiver when it adequately addresses the choice between jury and bench trials.
The opinion also underscores that self-represented defendants are subject to the invited-error doctrine, including when the asserted error concerns a fundamental right.