Background
Hoang Xuan “Wayne” Le, Sheila Marie Ritze, and Tri Minh “James” Dao left Dana Point Harbor on what Dao believed would be a lobster-fishing trip. Le and Ritze returned without Dao, whose body was later recovered from the Pacific Ocean. Dao had drowned after sustaining two gunshot wounds and blunt-force trauma. Cellphone-location evidence indicated that the boat likely traveled no farther than three nautical miles from shore.
Federal prosecutors charged Le with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possessing, using, and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. At trial, Le maintained that Dao was shot with his own gun during a struggle, while the government alleged that Le had planned the killing. During deliberations, juror BJR reported a mental-health crisis that she said arose from pressure by other jurors to reach a specific verdict. After she disclosed thoughts of self-harm and said she could not continue, the court—with the parties’ agreement—excused her and seated an alternate. The reconstituted jury convicted Le on all counts, and he received a life sentence.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit first held that the federal government had authority to prosecute the offenses. Section 901(a) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 places all of the United States’ 12-nautical-mile territorial sea within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of Title 18. That jurisdiction therefore includes the first three nautical miles from California’s shoreline, even though California also exercises criminal jurisdiction there.
The panel nevertheless vacated Le’s convictions because replacing BJR violated the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity guarantee. Under circuit precedent, a juror may be removed during deliberations only when the record leaves the court firmly convinced that the reason for removal is unrelated to the juror’s position on the merits. Here, BJR expressly connected her distress to pressure to reach a particular verdict, and the surrounding record supported a reasonable possibility that her removal stemmed from her merits views. Although the record did not establish her vote or confirm that she was a holdout, her mental-health crisis could not be treated as an independent ground for replacement. Because she could no longer deliberate, the constitutionally permissible course was a mistrial, not substitution of an alternate.
Assuming plain-error review applied, the panel held that all four requirements were satisfied. The error was clear under existing precedent, there was a reasonable probability of a different result because the original jury deliberated for more than three days while the reconstituted jury convicted in less than a day, and removing a juror for reasons tied to her merits views seriously undermined the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. Le’s agreement to the removal did not bar review because the Sixth Amendment unanimity protection implicated by the improper removal is not waivable.
Key Takeaways
- AEDPA § 901(a) places the entire 12-nautical-mile U.S. territorial sea within federal special maritime and territorial jurisdiction for applicable Title 18 offenses, including waters also subject to state jurisdiction.
- A deliberating juror cannot be replaced when there is a reasonable possibility that the reason for removal stems from the juror’s views on the merits.
- When merits-related pressure causes distress severe enough that a juror cannot continue, the court may declare a mistrial but may not substitute an alternate on the theory that the distress is an independent ground for removal.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms concurrent federal authority over applicable Title 18 crimes committed within the first three nautical miles off a state’s coast. It also reinforces the strict limits on replacing jurors after deliberations begin: courts must protect jurors from removal for reasons connected to their assessment of the case, even when the resulting distress is genuine and severe.
The ruling further establishes that a defendant’s consent does not validate a juror substitution that violates the Sixth Amendment’s nonwaivable unanimity guarantee. The panel vacated Le’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings.