Cincinnati v. Risconi Bar & Kitchen — Court affirms nuisance judgment and permanent injunction

Case
City of Cincinnati v. Risconi Bar & Kitchen, LLC, d.b.a. Rusconi Bar & Kitchen, Cherelle Jackson, f.k.a. Cherelle Brunis, and Martez Jackson
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals, First District
Judge
Moore, J. (opinion); Zayas, P.J. (concurring); Bock, J. (concurring in judgment only)
Date Decided
October 21, 2026
Docket No.
C-260057
Topics
Public nuisance, Liquor-law violations, Summary judgment, Injunctive relief
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

The City of Cincinnati sued Risconi Bar & Kitchen, LLC, which operated Rusconi Bar & Kitchen, along with Cherelle and Martez Jackson. The city alleged that recurring liquor-law violations—including underage and after-hours alcohol sales—made the bar a disorderly-house nuisance under R.C. 3767.01(C)(3). The city sought a declaration of nuisance and an injunction preventing the defendants from maintaining it at the bar’s location or elsewhere.

The city supported its partial-summary-judgment motion with authenticated Liquor Control Commission findings and the Jacksons’ deposition testimony acknowledging multiple violations. After the property owner evicted the bar, the trial court granted the city summary judgment on its statutory-nuisance claim and permanently enjoined the defendants from maintaining the nuisance at that location or anywhere else. The defendants appealed.

The Court’s Holding

The First District affirmed. It first held that the eviction and closure did not moot the case because R.C. 3767.03 and 3767.05(D) authorize an injunction against maintaining the nuisance elsewhere, and R.C. 3767.05(E)(2) does not require the unlawful use to remain ongoing at the time of the hearing.

The court also held that the commission findings and the Jacksons’ admissions established without a genuine factual dispute that alcohol had been sold in violation of law. Under the disjunctive language of R.C. 3767.01(C)(3), proof of unlawful alcohol sales was independently sufficient; the city did not also have to prove substantial interference with public decency, sobriety, peace, and good order or produce resulting criminal convictions.

Finally, the court held that piercing the LLC’s veil was unnecessary because R.C. 3767.02(A) imposes direct liability on people who control or aid the conduct of a nuisance. Cherelle Jackson controlled the bar’s operations, while Martez Jackson aided its operation by frequently performing tasks such as accepting deliveries and cleaning. Although the record did not clearly establish that Martez exercised control, any error in relying on that theory was harmless because the evidence established that he aided the nuisance’s conduct.

Key Takeaways

  • A disorderly-house nuisance under R.C. 3767.01(C)(3) may be established by unlawful alcohol sales without separate proof that the business substantially interfered with public order.
  • Admissions and Liquor Control Commission findings may establish the underlying violations; resulting criminal convictions are not required.
  • Eviction or closure does not moot a claim seeking a statutory injunction against maintaining the nuisance elsewhere.
  • Individuals who control or aid a nuisance may be directly liable under R.C. 3767.02(A), without piercing an LLC’s veil.

Why It Matters

The decision clarifies that Ohio’s disorderly-house statute provides alternative routes for proving a nuisance and permits prospective relief even after the offending establishment has closed or lost possession of its premises.

It also confirms that an LLC’s liability shield does not foreclose direct statutory responsibility for owners or other participants whose own conduct brings them within R.C. 3767.02(A).

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