Background
Dallas Eugene Harmon pleaded guilty to stalking and was initially sentenced to probation. After his probation was revoked, he was placed in community corrections. He later left the facility without permission, was arrested in Kansas, and was returned to Colorado.
When the trial court resentenced Harmon to the Department of Corrections in June 2023, it found him indigent and waived remaining fines and costs. The prosecution then sought $1,493.90 for the Adams County Sheriff’s Office’s costs of extraditing Harmon from Kansas. The court entered a judgment for that amount as costs of prosecution.
The Court’s Holding
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on People v. Howell, the division held that costs of prosecution are remedial rather than punitive: they reimburse the government’s actual prosecution expenses and are enforceable as a civil judgment. Thus, imposing the extradition-cost judgment after sentencing did not increase Harmon’s punishment or violate double-jeopardy protections.
The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying a waiver. Although the trial court had authority to waive costs for inability to pay, Harmon supplied no financial affidavit, similar documentation, or testimony establishing a present or future inability to pay. Counsel’s assertions that he was unemployed and lacked stable housing were not evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A post-sentencing judgment for prosecution costs does not violate double jeopardy when the assessment is remedial rather than punitive.
- Extradition expenses may be imposed as costs of prosecution under section 18-1.3-701.
- A defendant seeking a cost waiver bears the burden to prove inability to pay with financial evidence.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that criminal-prosecution costs, including extradition expenses, may be assessed after sentencing without constituting an unlawful sentence increase. It also underscores that a finding of indigency for one purpose does not itself establish inability to pay court costs.