Background
The parties married in 2011, separated in 2019, and divorced in 2024. They have two children. Their longstanding, high-conflict family dispute was managed by a single judge, who dealt with repeated applications concerning parenting, relocation, decision-making, and whether counsel should be appointed for the older child, E.M.I.
In December 2025, the case management judge declined to appoint counsel for E.M.I. Although satisfied that the parents’ conflict severely impaired their ability to act in the children’s best interests, the judge was not persuaded that appointing a lawyer was necessary to protect E.M.I.’s best interests. The judge cited the child’s age, possible parental alienation, insufficient tested evidence, and the risk that counsel’s appointment would intensify the conflict. On February 19, 2026, the judge refused the father’s application to vary that ruling. The father obtained leave to appeal and also sought to introduce letters from E.M.I., a mental health clinician, and the child’s pediatrician.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Reading the brief February reasons together with the December reasons and hearing transcripts, the Court held that the case management judge applied the two-part test under s. 203(1) of British Columbia’s Family Law Act. The judge found the required degree of parental conflict but reasonably concluded that appointing counsel was not necessary to protect the child’s best interests at that time.
The Court emphasized that a child’s wishes are important but not determinative and that appointing counsel is only one method of placing a child’s views before the court. Substantial deference was owed to the case management judge because he knew the family and its litigation history. The fresh-evidence application was also dismissed because the proposed letters reinforced E.M.I.’s wish for counsel but did not address the judge’s concerns and could not reasonably have changed the result. Costs were awarded to the respondent.
Key Takeaways
- Severe parental conflict alone does not justify appointing a child’s lawyer under s. 203(1); the appointment must also be necessary to protect the child’s best interests.
- A child’s expressed wish to have counsel is relevant but does not determine the best-interests analysis.
- Case management decisions in high-conflict family proceedings receive substantial appellate deference, particularly when informed by the judge’s familiarity with the family and litigation history.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that independent counsel for a child is not automatic even when parental conflict is extreme. Courts may consider whether an appointment could deepen the dispute and may use other statutory tools to receive the child’s views.
It also illustrates that concise reasons may withstand appellate review when the broader record clearly reveals the judge’s reasoning, and that fresh evidence merely repeating a child’s stated preference will not justify appellate intervention if it does not answer the concerns underlying the original decision.