Background
Nathaniel David Jessup was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and offering an indignity to human remains. The trial judge found that Jessup violently assaulted Katherine McAdam, causing her death, and then dismembered her body, concealed the remains, cleaned the suite, and took other steps to destroy evidence. The Crown had charged second-degree murder, but failed to prove the intent required for murder.
At a later dangerous-offender hearing, a different judge considered the trial findings, Jessup’s history of violent offences, his conduct in custody, and psychiatric evidence. The judge found a persistent pattern of aggressive behaviour showing substantial indifference to reasonably foreseeable consequences, a high likelihood of harmful recidivism, and intractable violent conduct. Jessup was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to indeterminate detention for manslaughter, with a concurrent three-year sentence for indignity to human remains.
Jessup abandoned his conviction appeal and challenged only the sentence. He argued that the sentencing judge assessed substantial indifference too narrowly, unreasonably inferred indifference from the manslaughter and post-offence conduct, and misinterpreted “persistent” in s. 753(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code. He sought a long-term-offender designation, a determinate prison sentence, and ten years of long-term supervision.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Reading the sentencing reasons functionally, contextually, and as a whole, it held that the judge considered the full circumstances of Jessup’s violent offending, including evidence of occasional remorse and the psychiatrist’s more recent evidence that Jessup showed little empathy and focused on himself rather than his victims. Any possible overstatement of the scope of a defence concession did not establish legal error.
The finding that Jessup’s conduct was callous and showed substantial indifference was reasonably available on the record. It rested on the violent fatal assault and Jessup’s extreme post-offence conduct, not on an assumption that manslaughter required the intent for murder. The finding therefore did not conflict with his acquittal on the murder charge.
The Court also rejected the argument that aggressive behaviour cannot be “persistent” if the last violent conviction predates sentencing. The repeated conduct from 2010 to 2017 could constitute an enduring and constantly repeated pattern even though it did not continue unabated to the hearing. The judge was entitled to weigh the absence of later convictions against Jessup’s continued incarceration, institutional controls, problematic custodial behaviour, and current psychiatric risk assessment. Because the designation stood, Jessup accepted that the indeterminate sentence could not be disturbed.
Key Takeaways
- Substantial indifference under s. 753(1)(a)(ii) is assessed from the record as a whole, including the offender’s conduct and attitude before, during, and after the relevant offences.
- A sentencing court may consider extreme post-offence conduct when assessing indifference without attributing to a manslaughter offender the intent required for murder.
- A persistent pattern need not continue uninterrupted until sentencing; gaps in convictions and the effects of incarceration are factors to be weighed in the case-specific assessment.
Why It Matters
The decision confirms that appellate courts review dangerous-offender designations more robustly than ordinary sentences but still defer to reasonable factual findings, including findings about future risk, substantial indifference, and treatment prospects.
It also clarifies that an earlier period of repeatedly aggressive conduct may satisfy the statutory requirement of persistence even when no recent violent conviction exists, particularly where custody limits opportunities to offend and current evidence shows that the risk of serious violence remains high.