Background
After receiving notice of Jane Roe’s impending California lawsuit involving allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment, John Doe sued Roe in the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging that Roe was attempting to extort and defame him. Roe moved to proceed pseudonymously in the Mississippi lawsuit. The district court denied her permission to do so, weighing the three Stegall factors and two additional factors—Roe’s status as a defendant and waiver.
Roe appealed that decision, raising several concerns with the district court’s analysis. The Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal because an order denying pseudonymity is an appealable collateral order.
The Court’s Holding
The court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for reconsideration. It agreed with some of Roe’s arguments and provided clarifications for the district court to apply on remand.
First, the court held that Roe’s status as a defendant is entitled to no weight in determining the appropriateness of pseudonymity. The use of the word “plaintiff” in articulating the Stegall test merely reflects that it is often plaintiffs who seek to proceed pseudonymously; it does not mean that only plaintiffs may litigate under a pseudonym. A defendant is no less deserving of pseudonymity than a plaintiff simply by virtue of being haled into court first.
Second, the court agreed that allegations of sexual assault involve matters of the utmost intimacy. Requiring alleged rape and sexual assault victims to proceed under their real identities would require them to disclose information of the utmost intimacy. The court also agreed that Roe’s privacy interest should not be weakened because the “cat” was already “out of the bag.” Internet sleuths speculating that Roe is a particular person because her California complaint “lines up with [her] public profile” is not the same as a public broadcasting of Roe’s certain identity. The fact that Roe’s name was a matter of public record for short periods was either because of Doe’s actions (which Roe objected to) or Roe’s inadvertent disclosures which counsel corrected and constituted no waiver.
Third, the court held that Roe did not waive her right to proceed anonymously. Her conduct did not constitute an “intentional relinquishment” of that position. Roe’s opposition to Doe’s motion to proceed pseudonymously waived nothing because her position was that she should be allowed to proceed pseudonymously while he should not be. Any confusion about Roe’s position was clarified by her subsequent motions seeking to seal or redact Doe’s amended complaint and to proceed pseudonymously. Doe’s use of Roe’s real name in open court did not constitute waiver on Roe’s behalf because Doe had already publicly named Roe, Roe had a pending motion seeking to seal or redact that amended complaint, and Roe objected to the use of her name at the hearing. Finally, Roe’s inadvertent disclosures of her real name in the California case and on appeal did not constitute waiver because they were unintentional, made in portions of larger filings, and Roe took steps to correct the errors once becoming aware of them.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s status as a defendant is entitled to no weight in determining whether she may proceed pseudonymously.
- Allegations of sexual assault involve matters of the utmost intimacy, and alleged victims may proceed under a pseudonym even when they are defendants being sued for libel and related torts.
- A party does not waive the right to proceed pseudonymously by opposing another party’s motion to proceed pseudonymously, by inadvertent disclosures that are corrected, or by another party’s use of her real name in open court when she has objected and sought to seal or redact the naming.
Why It Matters
This opinion clarifies that the Stegall factors apply equally to defendants and plaintiffs, and that a defendant’s status as such should not weigh against pseudonymity. It also provides guidance on when a party’s privacy interest is weakened by public disclosure and when waiver of pseudonymity occurs.
The case is remanded for the district court to reconsider whether Roe should be permitted to proceed under a pseudonym in light of these clarifications. The court expressed no view on the ultimate outcome of this issue.