Background
Amal Satyadharma, a 17-year-old NDIS participant with severe Autism Spectrum Disorder and epilepsy, had just finished high school. His father and NDIS nominee, Mariusz Hryniewiecki, sought funding for a post-school transition program, a support worker and transport. Instead, a plan dated 17 September 2026 substantially reduced several supports. A further plan dated 19 October 2026 provided limited interim funding, including funding described as supporting 30 hours per week on a 1:2 basis for six months, while restricting other supports, particularly speech therapy and physiotherapy.
The Administrative Review Tribunal refused a stay and a proposed “transitional order” requiring additional supports pending merits review, which was listed for December 2026. Mr Hryniewiecki then commenced Federal Court proceedings as an appeal under s 172 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) and sought urgent injunctions. Colvin J explained that s 172 appeals are confined to dispositive Tribunal decisions, so the appeal against the stay refusal was incompetent. He nevertheless permitted the matter to proceed as a s 39B Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) application against the CEO.
The requested orders would have restrained implementation of the September Plan, reinstated the August Plan, required funding for the new supports and restrained the September changes pending Tribunal review. The father’s written grounds, prepared with AI assistance, alleged Tribunal jurisdictional error. His oral case instead challenged the CEO’s September and October decisions as legally unreasonable; he confirmed that he relied on the oral claim and sought no relief against the Tribunal.
The Court’s Holding
Colvin J appointed Mr Hryniewiecki as litigation representative and dispensed with Federal Court Rules r 9.66(3), which would otherwise require a non-lawyer representative to have a lawyer. Those orders were limited to the interlocutory application. The Court relied on his NDIS nominee status, the urgency, the likelihood that the claim otherwise could not be pursued, and his acknowledgment of potential costs liability. Because no relief was maintained against the Tribunal, it was not a necessary party.
The Court rejected the written contention that ART Act s 54 allowed the Tribunal, before deciding the review, to exercise the CEO’s ongoing power to vary the plan and require additional supports. That power concerns making the dispositive decision on review; commencing a review does not transfer the CEO’s continuing administrative authority to the Tribunal. The interim “transitional order” theory therefore could not support jurisdictional error.
On the orally advanced CEO claim, the Court found no arguable basis for legal unreasonableness. The father’s submissions demonstrated disagreement with the funding assessment, but not that the October decision exceeded the CEO’s statutory discretion. The CEO had recognised a risk of informal-care breakdown, considered the requested support excessive or insufficiently evidenced, and provided targeted interim assistance pending further assessment. Because the October Plan replaced the September Plan, no separate unreasonableness issue concerning September could arise without an arguable challenge to October. The Court also noted that the available Tribunal merits review would usually count strongly against judicial-review relief, although it did not decide that discretionary issue.
Although unnecessary to the result, the Court found for interlocutory purposes that the balance of convenience would have favoured an injunction because of the risk of informal-care breakdown. It did not accept that the evidence established likely irreversible regression or significant interim harm from the therapy changes. Even with an arguable claim, however, it would not have granted the requested mandatory terms: invalidity would require reconsideration by the CEO, not judicial selection of NDIS supports. Relief compelling particular supports would require a statutory entitlement or a demonstration that no reasonable decision could refuse them; neither was claimed. The injunction application was dismissed, with costs submissions ordered and costs to be determined on the papers unless otherwise ordered.
Key Takeaways
- A non-dispositive ART stay refusal could not be appealed under s 172, but the Court allowed the urgent matter to proceed under s 39B.
- The father’s appointment and permission to appear without a lawyer were confined to the interlocutory application.
- The unreasonableness challenge failed for want of an arguable legal basis, notwithstanding a favourable interim balance-of-convenience assessment.
- Even an invalid NDIS funding decision would not ordinarily authorise the Court to dictate particular supports.
Why It Matters
The decision separates three questions often compressed in urgent NDIS cases: whether an interim Tribunal order is legally available, whether a funding decision is arguably unlawful, and whether interim hardship justifies preserving the Court’s ability to grant final relief. Here, serious care concerns satisfied the balance of convenience but could not cure the absence of an arguable legal claim or justify relief exceeding the available final remedy.
Colvin J also warned that AI-assisted submissions can leave courts unable to test or clarify a self-represented litigant’s case. Litigants remain responsible for adopting, checking and answering for those submissions; AI is not a supervised lawyer substitute. The observations explain the procedural confusion here, but did not replace the claim-specific analysis that determined the injunction application.