Background
Six first responders—two law-enforcement officers and four towing-company workers—sued Old Dominion Freight Line and driver Aaron Foster after an April 20, 2018 tractor-trailer crash on Highway 70 in St. Francis County. A pickup driven by Charles Henley crossed the center line and struck Foster’s truck; the parties stipulated Henley alone caused the accident. One trailer carried a 565-pound barrel of formic acid. Because it weighed less than 1,001 pounds, federal law did not require a hazardous-materials placard, though permissive placarding was allowed. Deputy Jeff Goff and Trooper Keith Ponder testified Foster denied hauling hazardous materials when asked; Foster and another witness disputed Ponder’s account. Old Dominion did not notify authorities of the formic acid until 8:51 p.m., more than five hours after the crash. The responders described sudden, unusual odors, burning airways, and breathing difficulty, and all sought emergency treatment. They alleged permanent or worsened conditions including RADS, COPD, asthma, GERD, and rhinosinusitis.
After a December 2021 trial, the jury found Old Dominion negligent through its employees for failing to disclose the hazardous material to emergency-response authorities and found that negligence proximately caused the injuries. It awarded $75 million in compensatory damages: $25 million to Frank McMillion, $20 million to Bengi Bokker, $15 million to Allen Jones, and $5 million each to Hunter Bokker, Zack Billingsley, and Carlton Pettus. The jury determined Old Dominion was not liable for punitive damages, so the second trial phase was unnecessary. The circuit court’s new-trial-or-remittitur motion was deemed denied. In a substituted opinion on rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, concluding the damages lacked substantial-evidence support. The Supreme Court granted review and treated the appeal as originally filed there.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the circuit court and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. Reviewing directed-verdict rulings for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo, it rejected a categorical heightened causation requirement for every toxic-tort case. Distinguishing long-term-exposure decisions such as Richardson, Chavers, and Green, the court followed the flexible approach reflected in TMG Cattle and the Restatement: exposure, general causation, and specific causation are not invariably separate elements requiring independent proof. Here, the isolated exposure, immediate symptoms and treatment, close temporal and spatial connection, responders’ testimony, and Dr. Scott Manaker’s examinations, testing, records review, and experience supplied substantial evidence of factual and proximate causation. The court therefore upheld both the denial of directed verdict and the refusal of appellants’ heightened-causation instruction.
On preemption, the court held the claims did not impose requirements beyond the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. Plaintiffs did not seek extra placarding, and the jury received the permissive-placarding rule. Their notification theory was substantively the same as 49 U.S.C. § 5110(c)’s requirement to disclose information immediately upon request by emergency-response authorities, supported by testimony that Foster was asked and denied hazardous cargo. The professional-rescuer doctrine did not bar recovery because these responders were not trained, equipped, or paid to assume hazardous-material exposure; alternatively, nondisclosure of a hidden peril prevented its application. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting Richard’s and Dorrity’s industry-safety testimony or Manaker’s causation opinions, excluding the Ponder investigative file and proposed cross-examination, retaining the jury pool, admitting Thereasa May’s nonhearsay testimony, denying a mistrial over the shadow jury, and partially bifurcating punitive damages. Challenges to three responders’ medical bills, Richard’s demonstrative aid, and particular Reptile Theory conduct were unpreserved.
Finally, the court held the circuit court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by denying a new trial or remittitur. Viewing the proof favorably to appellees, it identified substantial evidence of permanent injury and meaningful loss of normal life, emphasized the individualized awards and rejection of punitive liability, and declined cross-case comparisons. Justice Cody Hiland dissented, joined by Justices Wood and Bronni, arguing the awards were excessive and causation unproven.
Key Takeaways
- Arkansas does not require the same heightened causation showing in every toxic-tort case; isolated exposure may be proved through the combined medical and circumstantial record.
- The notification claim survived HMTA preemption because it matched federal disclosure duties, not because the court approved additional placarding requirements.
- Several appellate arguments failed on circumstance-specific preservation grounds, including absent proffers, missing record material, and lack of contemporaneous objections.
- The damages ruling applied manifest-abuse-of-discretion and substantial-evidence review to this record; it did not announce a general rule based on verdict size or medical bills.
Why It Matters
The decision supplies a detailed framework for acute, one-time chemical-exposure cases while preserving traditional jury roles in causation and noneconomic damages. It also separates legal preemption review from deferential review of evidence, trial management, and remittitur.
For litigators, the opinion is equally significant for its procedural rulings: proposed instructions must accurately state the applicable causation standard, excluded evidence generally requires a proffer, and motions in limine do not replace contemporaneous objections to later argument or testimony.