Background
The State filed a neglect and abuse petition on November 6, 2024, after the minors’ father, Jamary H., allegedly struck one-year-old Jamin with a belt, leaving a bruise. Amari was three. The children had been taken into protective custody on November 4, and the circuit court placed them in DCFS’s temporary custody following a shelter-care hearing. On January 8, 2025, the court adjudicated the minors neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare. At the January 22 dispositional hearing, it made them wards of the court and found Mother unfit to care for them at that stage, based on the dispositional report.
Webster-Cantrell Youth Advocacy (WCYA), the DCFS-contracted agency, subsequently reported mixed service participation. Mother completed parenting and domestic-violence programming, but providers questioned whether she could apply protective skills. She did not consistently engage in recommended mental-health counseling. Reports also described Father’s continuing presence in her home, his controlling behavior, and Mother’s difficulty protecting herself and the children from him. The children were doing well in a relative placement. In August 2025, the court found reasonable efforts but not reasonable and substantial progress; in February 2026, it found neither reasonable efforts nor reasonable and substantial progress and changed the goal to substitute care pending a termination determination.
The State’s February 6, 2026, termination motion alleged three grounds: failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility; failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the removal conditions; and failure to make reasonable progress toward the children’s return during May 6, 2025, through February 6, 2026. After an April 27 fitness hearing, the court rejected the first ground but found the other two proved. Following a June 11 best-interest hearing, it terminated Mother’s rights and changed the permanency goal to adoption.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District reversed. It explained that involuntary termination first requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness under section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. Appellate courts defer to the trial court’s assessment of witnesses and reverse an unfitness finding only when it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The finding must rest solely on properly admitted evidence.
Reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are distinct grounds. Efforts are assessed subjectively, by what is reasonable for the particular parent and whether the parent made earnest and conscientious strides toward correcting the removal conditions. Progress is assessed objectively, using compliance with service plans and court directives, the conditions causing removal, and later-known conditions preventing return. At minimum, progress requires measurable or demonstrable movement toward reunification.
Here, no service plans were filed with the circuit court or admitted at the fitness hearing. The record contained no evidence that Mother received them, and the caseworker did not explain who prepared or reviewed the plans, which services were ordered, or when requirements were added. Although the evidence showed that Mother completed some services but failed to apply the lessons, the court could not measure her efforts or progress without knowing the applicable service requirements. Both unfitness findings therefore were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because unfitness is a prerequisite to termination, the court also reversed the best-interest finding and termination order without addressing Mother’s separate best-interest argument.
Key Takeaways
- A termination case relying on unreasonable efforts or insufficient progress requires an evidentiary basis for evaluating the parent’s compliance with applicable service plans and court directives.
- The absence of filed or admitted service plans, evidence of receipt, and testimony identifying their requirements prevented meaningful review of both unfitness grounds.
- The ruling did not dispute evidence that Mother failed to implement service lessons; it held that this evidence alone could not supply the missing benchmark for measuring efforts and progress.
- The court reversed the termination and remanded for further proceedings, leaving the State free to seek termination again in the ongoing case.
Why It Matters
The court directed that WCYA or DCFS file any additional service plans going forward. Although the statutory 45-day filing requirement is directory and untimely filing does not eliminate authority to enter a dispositional order, the circuit court must review required services for appropriateness and availability. If the State renews termination proceedings on reasonable-efforts or reasonable-progress grounds, it must offer into evidence the service plans applicable to every relevant nine-month period.
The decision was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances permitted by Rule 23(e)(1).