Background
A.M. had been involved in an employment arbitration after her employer terminated her while she was on medical leave. The arbitration was administered by JAMS Boston, where K.S. served as director of operations. The arbitration did not go well for A.M., and she directed her frustration at K.S.—the organizational face of the proceeding from A.M.’s perspective—rather than at any party or decision-maker in the underlying dispute.
Over a period of time, A.M. placed phone calls, left voicemails, and sent other communications to K.S. The communications were threatening in nature. Specifically, A.M.’s messages referenced two recent, high-profile incidents in which one person killed a corporate executive out of disgruntlement and another person took the lives of her young children. A.M. had also accumulated personal information about K.S. and her family, which K.S. found particularly alarming. K.S. testified that the communications caused her to fear for her safety and the safety of her children. A.M., for her part, testified that “all she was looking for was understanding and empathy.” A.M. later explained in her brief that she had sought out K.S. specifically because K.S. held a psychology degree and she expected K.S. to possess communication skills and “active listening” abilities appropriate to a person with that background.
On July 29, 2025, a judge issued a harassment prevention order protecting K.S. under G.L. c. 258E, Massachusetts’s civil harassment prevention statute. The judge found, in consideration of the credible and relevant evidence, that K.S. had met her burden. A.M. appealed, contending that her conduct was not “malicious” as defined by c. 258E because she was “simply trying to get help regarding her legal case.”
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court affirmed in a Rule 23.0 summary decision by Justices Massing, Ditkoff, and Hand. Chapter 258E, Massachusetts’s civil harassment statute, authorizes issuance of a protective order when a plaintiff demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed three or more acts of “willful and malicious conduct” directed at the plaintiff, with the intent to cause fear or intimidation, that in fact caused fear or intimidation. The statute defines “malicious” as “characterized by cruelty, hostility or revenge.” G.L. c. 258E, § 1. In evaluating whether that element is satisfied, the court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances and may draw reasonable inferences to determine the defendant’s intent. A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 538 (2015).
The Appeals Court found no error. A.M.’s own testimony established that she was “angry, frustrated, traumatized, and resentful” about the arbitration proceedings. The trial judge credited K.S.’s testimony about the threatening and alarming nature of the communications, and the judge’s issuance of the order implicitly reflected a rejection of A.M.’s claim that she meant no harm. The panel accorded the credibility determination the “utmost deference” owed to a judge who heard the testimony and observed the parties’ demeanor. The evidence as a whole—threatening references to recent, violent crimes; accumulation of personal information about K.S. and her family; repeated contact directed at K.S.—permitted the inference that A.M.’s conduct was grounded in hostility and revenge and was made with the intent to cause K.S. fear and intimidation. The panel accordingly discerned no error of law or abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order.
Key Takeaways
- Under G.L. c. 258E (Massachusetts’s civil harassment prevention statute), “malicious” conduct means conduct characterized by cruelty, hostility, or revenge. A defendant’s subjective claim that she was “only seeking help” or “trying to be understood” will not negate malice if the surrounding circumstances—the content of threats, the defendant’s emotional state, and the impact on the victim—permit an inference of hostile or retaliatory intent.
- Threats that invoke or reference high-profile violent acts—particularly when paired with evidence that the defendant has gathered personal information about the plaintiff and her family—provide a strong factual basis for a finding of willful and malicious conduct under c. 258E.
- Credibility determinations by the judge who heard live testimony are accorded the “utmost deference” on appeal. Where the trial judge credited the plaintiff and the record supports that finding, an appellate claim of error on the “malicious” element faces a very high bar.
- A harassment prevention order under c. 258E can arise in purely civil or commercial contexts—here, out of a workplace arbitration dispute with no prior relationship between the parties. The statute is not limited to domestic or intimate-partner situations.
Why It Matters
K.S. v. A.M. is a useful illustration of how G.L. c. 258E applies to harassment that arises in commercial or quasi-professional contexts rather than in domestic or intimate-partner settings. The defendant here was a frustrated litigant lashing out at a neutral administrator—precisely the kind of situation in which a party might believe her communications were merely “venting” or seeking empathy, when in fact the recipient experienced them as threatening. For Massachusetts civil practitioners, the case underscores that references to real-world violent events, particularly in the context of communications directed at someone associated with a legal proceeding that went badly for the sender, can satisfy the “malicious” element even absent an explicit threat.
For arbitration administrators, dispute resolution professionals, and others who work in contexts where disgruntled parties may direct frustration at them personally, the case serves as a reminder that c. 258E protection extends to their workplace safety. A single phone call or message may not suffice, but a pattern of communications referencing violence, combined with evidence that the sender has gathered personal information about the recipient, can meet the three-act threshold and support issuance of a protective order.