Background
In December 2022, Susan Cheung filed a complaint in Superior Court against Dr. Thomas Puschak and Carol Puschak. The complaint alleged that Dr. Puschak committed medical malpractice, sexually assaulted the plaintiffs, attempted to poison Christopher Cheung (Susan’s adult son), and engaged in insurance fraud. Susan appeared pro se and purported to represent both herself and Christopher.
The first case did not progress on the merits. In early 2023, a Superior Court judge ordered the Cheungs to submit a more definite statement under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(e), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). The Cheungs did not comply. In March 2023, the judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice as a sanction under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with the court’s order. Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(3), dismissals for that reason “operate as an adjudication upon the merits” unless an exception applies or the dismissal order specifies otherwise. The Cheungs did not appeal the dismissal.
Approximately six months later, Susan Cheung filed a second complaint against the same defendants alleging the same claims: malpractice, sexual assault, attempted poisoning, and insurance fraud. In November 2024, a second Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to the defendants on res judicata grounds, concluding that the claims were barred by the prior final judgment. The Cheungs appealed. The Appeals Court noted—as a Superior Court judge had done at least twice—that Susan Cheung, as a non-attorney appearing pro se, cannot represent Christopher (her adult son) in court proceedings and may only represent herself.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court affirmed in a Rule 23.0 summary decision by Justices Desmond, D’Angelo, and Smyth. The panel reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo, asking whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Puschaks were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of claim preclusion. Claim preclusion (res judicata) prevents a party from relitigating a claim that was or could have been adjudicated in a prior proceeding where a valid final judgment was entered. It requires three elements: (1) identity or privity of the parties; (2) identity of the cause of action; and (3) a prior final judgment on the merits.
All three elements were met. The parties were identical in both suits. The causes of action were identical: in both cases the Cheungs alleged that Dr. Puschak committed malpractice, sexually assaulted them, attempted to poison Christopher, and engaged in insurance fraud—all claims derived from the same transaction or series of connected transactions. The most contested element was whether the first dismissal constituted a “final judgment on the merits.” The court held that it did: Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b)(3) expressly provides that any dismissal of a complaint, other than dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to join a necessary party, or improper damages, “operates as an adjudication upon the merits,” unless the dismissal is pursuant to Rule 41(b)(1) or the order of dismissal specifies otherwise. None of those exceptions applied here—the dismissal was a sanction for failure to comply with a court order, not a dismissal for jurisdictional or procedural defect, and the order did not carve out any exception. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for the Puschaks.
Key Takeaways
- A dismissal with prejudice under Mass. R. Civ. P. 41(b) as a sanction for failure to comply with a court order constitutes a “final judgment on the merits” for purposes of claim preclusion, triggering res judicata as to any claims that were or could have been raised in the dismissed action. A plaintiff who does not appeal a sanction dismissal cannot simply refile the same complaint.
- The three elements of claim preclusion under Massachusetts law are: (1) identity or privity of parties, (2) identity of the cause of action (claims derived from the same transaction or connected transactions), and (3) a prior final judgment on the merits. Where all three are met, summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate without reaching the underlying merits.
- The Rule 41(b)(3) default—that any involuntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits—is a powerful procedural rule. Its exceptions (jurisdictional dismissals, improper-venue dismissals, failure-to-join dismissals, and dismissals that explicitly state otherwise) are narrow.
- A pro se litigant may represent herself but may not represent other adults, even family members, in Massachusetts court proceedings. A parent appearing pro se cannot assert rights on behalf of an adult child.
Why It Matters
Cheung v. Puschak is a straightforward application of Massachusetts claim preclusion doctrine, but it carries a pointed lesson about Rule 41(b) dismissals. Litigants—particularly those appearing pro se—sometimes treat a sanction dismissal as a setback that can simply be corrected by refiling. This decision makes clear that a dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order has the same preclusive effect as a judgment on the merits: the dismissed claims are extinguished. A plaintiff who believes the first dismissal was wrong must appeal it; filing a new action with the same claims will not give the court a second bite at the merits.
For Massachusetts civil practitioners, the decision is also a reminder of the rule that only licensed attorneys may represent other parties in court. A parent cannot litigate on behalf of an adult child as a pro se party, even in the context of shared claims arising from the same set of events. Where a pro se plaintiff attempts to represent a family member, counsel for the defendant should raise the point early, as courts have repeatedly found it necessary to address the issue even when the parties have not raised it.