Background
In July 2024, Ashour Hamid’s two adult sons, Ahmad Hamid and Abdalramhan Hamid, petitioned the Jefferson Family Court for an emergency protective order against him, alleging domestic violence. Ashour’s wife, Leila, filed a separate EPO petition the same day. The family court granted EPOs prohibiting Ashour from coming within 500 feet of the family home, where the family had lived together. It amended the EPOs in October 2024 to let Ashour retrieve personal property. Following a November 2024 hearing at which it found that domestic violence had occurred, the family court entered three-year domestic violence orders for the sons and Leila. The DVOs retained the 500-foot restriction.
Leila died on April 25, 2025. Ashour then asked the family court to let him take possession of the residence. In a July 2025 order, the family court denied that request, citing the DVO remaining in effect until 2027 and Leila’s will, which required probate. The order stated that the family court lacked jurisdiction to determine a probate issue. Ashour did not appeal.
Ashour instead sued his sons in Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking injunctions requiring them to vacate the home and awarding possession to him, plus a restraining order barring their reentry. He attached a deed identifying himself as the property’s sole grantee and requested a hearing. The sons answered that Leila had a marital interest she intended them to inherit, that she and Ashour had lived separately, and that they paid the home’s utilities and upkeep. The circuit court denied a hearing and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It characterized the pleading as combining a forcible detainer action, within the district court’s exclusive jurisdiction, with an attempt to modify family court orders, which the circuit court could not review or modify.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the jurisdictional dismissal but modified it to be without prejudice. Judge Easton wrote for the unanimous panel. Jurisdiction was a legal question reviewed de novo, under St. Joseph Catholic Orphan Society v. Edwards, 449 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Ky. 2014). The court distinguished the circuit court’s general subject-matter jurisdiction over real-property disputes from jurisdiction over the particular issues of immediate possession in forcible detainer cases and possession in domestic violence proceedings.
The court could not determine with certainty whether Ashour and his sons had a landlord-tenant relationship because no hearing had occurred and the record contained only limited pleadings. It said their relationship could support an inference that the sons were tenants at will. Regardless, the complaint’s plain wording demanded that the sons immediately vacate and sought possession for Ashour, making it sound like a forcible detainer action. The court stated that Kentucky district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such actions under KRS 383.540 and 383.210, and that KRS 24A.020 makes statutorily granted district court jurisdiction exclusive unless a statute expressly provides for concurrent jurisdiction.
Independently, the court held that the requested relief would necessarily alter the DVOs’ requirement that Ashour remain at least 500 feet from the residence. Whether treated as an appeal of those restrictions or a new action, the suit could not be used as a detour around the family court’s possession ruling. The family court could alter a DVO upon changed circumstances, and a separate circuit court ownership decision would not automatically change the DVO’s effect. On this sparse record, the panel found no error in concluding that Ashour was attempting a forcible detainer eviction or trying to circumvent the family court order. It agreed with him only that a jurisdictional dismissal is not a merits adjudication and generally should be without prejudice, citing City of Pikeville v. Kentucky Concealed Carry Coalition, Inc., 671 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Ky. 2023). Acting under KRS 22A.060, the panel modified the order directly rather than remanding for that textual correction.
Key Takeaways
- The affirmance concerned Ashour’s claims as pleaded; the court did not decide ownership or his ultimate right to possession.
- The requested eviction and possession relief independently implicated exclusive district court forcible detainer jurisdiction and the family court’s existing DVO restrictions.
- The court did not definitively find a landlord-tenant relationship; it identified only a possible tenancy-at-will inference on the limited pleadings.
- The dismissal was modified to without prejudice because lack of jurisdiction was not an adjudication on the merits.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates how Kentucky’s allocation of jurisdiction among circuit, district, and family courts can control a property dispute framed as a request for injunctive relief. A deed and general real-property jurisdiction did not permit the circuit court to grant relief that functioned as an eviction or required alteration of an existing DVO. The court also emphasized avoiding conflicting orders while preserving processes for determining ownership and possession.
The modification leaves open a properly pleaded future circuit court action, potentially in contested probate proceedings or otherwise, without deciding its propriety. The panel also addressed briefing defects: Ashour’s brief lacked a preservation statement and record citations required by RAP 32, while the sons filed no brief. Although RAP 31(H)(3) supplied discretionary responses to the missing appellee brief and dismissal of the appeal would have been justified, the court reviewed the small record because the appeal presented a pure legal question. That exercise of discretion was circumstance-specific, not a general waiver of appellate briefing requirements.