Background
Andrew Calhoun Saxon appealed from a Judicial Default and Default Final Judgment for Possession entered in a mobile home lot eviction action. The appeal was brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 from the County Court for Pinellas County, where Susan Bedinghaus was the judge. Saxon proceeded pro se on appeal. Patrick M. Singer of Landlord Law, P.A., in Tampa, represented Bay Ranch Mobile Village, LLP, doing business as Bay Ranch Mobile Home Park.
The county court found that Saxon failed to deposit rent as ordered by the court. It concluded that this failure constituted an absolute waiver of his defenses under section 723.063(2), Florida Statutes (2026), and that Bay Ranch Mobile Village, the mobile home park owner, was therefore entitled to a default judgment in its favor.
Paragraph three of the judgment stated that “[a] Judicial Default is entered against Defendant, ANDREW CALHOUN SAXON.” The Second District explained that this entry was required by section 723.063(2). The judgment nevertheless cited section 83.60(2), Florida Statutes (2026). Bay Ranch Mobile Village conceded in its answer brief that citing section 83.60(2) was error.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Morris wrote the opinion, with Judges Khouzam and Guard concurring. The court found no error in the county court’s determination that Saxon’s failure to deposit rent as ordered resulted in an absolute waiver of defenses and entitled the park owner to a default judgment. It quoted section 723.063(2): “The failure of the mobile home owner to pay the rent, or portion thereof, into the registry of the court as required herein constitutes an absolute waiver of the mobile home owner’s defenses other than payment, and the park owner is entitled to an immediate default.”
The court distinguished the legally correct entry of judicial default from the judgment’s erroneous statutory citation. Because the judgment correctly entered the default against Saxon as required by section 723.063(2), but cited the wrong statute, the court affirmed the judgment and remanded for the trial court to correct the scrivener’s error with an amended judgment citing the operative statute. It affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
The court cited T.M. v. Department of Children & Families, 298 So. 3d 146, 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), which affirmed a judgment but remanded for correction of scrivener’s errors where the written judgment cited incorrect statutory subsections for three grounds. It also cited Tunstall v. Gonzalez-Tunstall, 278 So. 3d 254, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), which affirmed an order in all respects but remanded to correct a scrivener’s error that had no substantive effect, citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 841 So. 2d 564, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
Key Takeaways
- The Second District upheld the county court’s application of section 723.063(2) to Saxon’s failure to deposit rent as ordered.
- Under the quoted statute, that failure constitutes an absolute waiver of defenses other than payment and entitles the park owner to an immediate default.
- The erroneous citation to section 83.60(2) did not require reversal because the judgment correctly entered judicial default under section 723.063(2).
- The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, with a remand for an amended judgment citing the operative statute.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the statutory rent-deposit and default provision in a mobile home lot eviction action while separating the validity of the default from an incorrect statutory reference in the written judgment. The appellate court accepted the parties’ shared position that the citation was erroneous, but did not disturb the possession judgment.
The limited remand directs correction of the scrivener’s error through an amended judgment. The opinion states that it is subject to revision prior to official publication.