Background
The Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia issued an order on November 2, 2026, in Ronald Pace v. Synergy Investing, LLC, docket number A27A0682. The underlying action concerned specific performance and breach of contract. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of Synergy Investing, LLC. The order does not describe the underlying transaction, the contractual provisions at issue, the amount or terms of the judgment, or the evidence presented in the trial court.
Ronald Pace, appearing pro se, filed a motion to set aside the judgment. He based the motion on improper service and fraud, grounds set forth in OCGA § 9-11-60(d). The trial court denied Pace’s motion. Pace then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The order identifies that filing as a direct appeal and does not state that Pace filed an application for discretionary review.
The appellate court’s order addresses the procedural route for challenging the denial of Pace’s motion, rather than the merits of the underlying contract claims. It does not determine whether service was improper, whether fraud occurred, whether the judgment should have been set aside, or whether Synergy Investing, LLC was entitled to specific performance or damages for breach of contract. The order also does not supply a factual record concerning Pace’s allegations beyond identifying the grounds he asserted in his motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction over Pace’s direct appeal. It explained that the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must be brought by application for discretionary review. In support of that proposition, the court cited OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b), and Jim Ellis Atlanta v. Adamson, 283 Ga. App. 116, 116 (640 SE2d 688) (2006).
The court further stated that compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure is jurisdictional. It cited Smoak v. Dep’t of Human Res., 221 Ga. App. 257, 257 (471 SE2d 60) (1996), for that principle. Applying the procedure to Pace’s filing, the court concluded that his failure to comply with the discretionary appeal procedure deprived it of jurisdiction over the direct appeal.
The holding is therefore tied to the particular postjudgment ruling Pace sought to challenge: the trial court’s denial of his motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d). The court did not announce that every appeal in every specific-performance or breach-of-contract action requires discretionary review. Nor did it treat Pace’s pro se status as changing the jurisdictional requirement stated in the order. The direct appeal was dismissed because the required discretionary-review procedure had not been followed.
Key Takeaways
- The Court of Appeals dismissed Pace’s direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without deciding the merits of his improper-service and fraud allegations.
- Under the procedure stated in the order, denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d) must be challenged through an application for discretionary review.
- The court relied on OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(8), (b), Jim Ellis Atlanta v. Adamson, and Smoak v. Dep’t of Human Res. in explaining the required procedure and its jurisdictional character.
- The order does not resolve the underlying specific-performance and breach-of-contract dispute or alter the stated fact that the trial court entered final judgment for Synergy Investing, LLC.
Why It Matters
The order underscores that the method used to seek appellate review can determine whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider a challenge. For a party seeking review of the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60(d), the court identified an application for discretionary review as the required route. A notice of direct appeal did not provide a substitute for compliance with that procedure in this case.
The dismissal should not be read as a ruling that Pace’s service or fraud contentions lacked merit. The court did not evaluate those contentions, and it did not review the correctness of the trial court’s denial of the motion. Its decision was limited to the jurisdictional consequence of pursuing a direct appeal rather than following the discretionary appeal procedure. The order likewise provides no additional analysis of the underlying contract claims, no discussion of a standard of appellate review, and no findings about the factual basis for either party’s position.
The document concludes with a clerk’s certification that the order is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia, together with a signature and seal. The order does not identify a panel, an authoring judge, or other deciding judges, and no judicial names should be inferred from the clerk’s signature.