Background
Petitioners Zivit and Yuval Nanikvshili filed suit in 2023 against Kibbutz Yizrael, challenging the expulsion of Zivit from kibbutz membership and the earlier termination of Yuval’s membership in 2013. The kibbutz responded with a counterclaim for debts allegedly accrued while the petitioners continued living on the kibbutz after their memberships ended. In February 2024 the district court gave effect to a consent order — a temporary injunction — allowing the petitioners to remain in their home on the kibbutz until a final judgment was handed down in their claim.
An evidentiary hearing was set for November 18, 2025. The petitioners obtained a postponement citing Zivit’s illness. A rescheduled hearing was fixed for January 14, 2026. Two days before that date the petitioners sought another postponement, claiming Yuval was compelled to travel abroad urgently on business and Zivit would be covering his work — leaving neither able to attend. The district court (Judge Taha) rejected the application, noting the hearing had been fixed more than six weeks in advance and that personal business preferences were not grounds for postponement.
Despite that rejection, neither petitioner appeared at the January 14 hearing; only their attorney attended. Counsel presented a medical certificate for Zivit, but the certificate expressly stated on its face that it was not valid for use before judicial institutions, contained no medical diagnosis, and was unsupported by any affidavit. Yuval’s absence was left entirely unexplained. The district court struck out the petitioners’ claim under Regulation 75(1) of the Civil Procedure Regulations 2018, ordered the petitioners to pay the kibbutz NIS 20,000 in costs, and proceeded to hear the kibbutz’s counterclaim in their absence, accepting the counterclaim by judgment of June 9, 2026. The petitioners sought leave to appeal all three elements of the partial judgment before Justice Ruth Ronen of the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Holding
Justice Ronen first addressed the classification of the ruling under challenge. She held that a striking-out for non-appearance is more akin to a striking-out for non-payment of court fees than to a judgment on the merits: it creates no res judicata, it decides no substantive rights, and its cause — non-appearance — is collateral to the underlying dispute. Accordingly the ruling requires leave to appeal rather than conferring an appeal as of right, consistent with how the petitioners had framed their application.
On the central legal question, Justice Ronen resolved a recurring ambiguity among Israeli district courts regarding the scope of judicial discretion under Regulation 75(1) of the 2018 Civil Procedure Regulations. Under the former Civil Procedure Regulations 1984, Regulation 157(3) explicitly stated that when a plaintiff fails to appear the court “may” strike out or dismiss the claim. The 2018 Regulations deliberately removed the word “may,” replacing it with mandatory language: when the plaintiff fails to appear and no reasonable cause is given, the court “shall” strike out the claim, or dismiss it if special reasons for dismissal are found. Reading this against the adjacent regulations — which uniformly use permissive language — and in light of the 2018 reform’s stated goals of procedural efficiency and discipline, the Court held that judicial discretion now operates only at the threshold: the court decides whether “reasonable cause” for non-appearance has been established. Once it determines that no such cause exists, it must choose between striking out and dismissal; it may not adjourn or impose any lesser sanction instead.
Applied to the facts, the district court’s finding that neither petitioner had provided reasonable cause was upheld without interference: Zivit’s certificate was facially invalid for court proceedings and carried no diagnosis; Yuval’s absence went wholly unexplained even after his claimed urgent-travel justification had been rejected. Because the kibbutz’s resulting harm was purely financial and compensable, the district court correctly chose striking out — the less severe option under the regulation — over outright dismissal. The automatic lapse of the temporary injunction that followed, while consequential, did not affect this analysis. The Supreme Court also declined to grant leave on costs, which is barred by Section 8(1) of the Courts Order on Non-Appealable Decisions 2009. As for the counterclaim, final judgment had already been entered on June 9, 2026; any challenge must be brought in a separate appeal from that judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Under Regulation 75(1) of Israel’s Civil Procedure Regulations 2018, a court that finds no reasonable cause for a plaintiff’s non-appearance has no residual discretion to adjourn; it is required to strike out or dismiss the claim, marking a deliberate departure from the permissive “may” language of the 1984 Regulations.
- The court’s discretion under the new regulation is confined to the threshold question of whether the plaintiff has offered “reasonable cause” — a structurally important narrowing of the previous regime.
- A striking-out for non-appearance does not create res judicata and is procedural rather than substantive in character; it therefore requires leave to appeal rather than an appeal as of right.
- A temporary injunction tied to the pendency of a claim lapses automatically when that claim is struck out; the plaintiff’s remedy is to refile and seek a fresh injunction.
- Leave to appeal a costs order is independently barred under Section 8(1) of the Courts Order on Non-Appealable Decisions 2009, and challenges to interlocutory rulings absorbed into a subsequent final judgment on a counterclaim must be raised in an appeal from that final judgment.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a significant doctrinal split among Israeli district courts on the scope of judicial discretion under Regulation 75(1) of the 2018 Civil Procedure Regulations. By holding that the omission of the word “may” was deliberate — not a drafting oversight — the Supreme Court establishes that courts must now choose between striking out and dismissal when a plaintiff fails to appear without reasonable cause; adjournment or other intermediate responses are no longer available. This ruling reinforces the 2018 reform’s core commitments to procedural efficiency, certainty, and the curtailment of strategic delay, and it clarifies the law for both litigants and lower courts that have been divided on the point.
The case also highlights an acute practical risk for parties who rely on temporary injunctions to preserve their position while litigation is pending. Where the injunction is expressly predicated on the pendency of the underlying claim, its lapse upon a striking-out is automatic and immediate — regardless of how strong the substantive case may be. Litigants in possession disputes, membership disputes, or any context where interim relief is tethered to the active proceeding must be aware that procedural defaults can carry severe collateral consequences beyond the loss of the hearing date itself.