Background
Shortly before 11 p.m. on December 5, 2020, New Lenox Police Sergeant David Dileto and Officer Jacob Klepk were dispatched to Silver Cross Hospital in New Lenox, Illinois to investigate a possible criminal trespass. The subject, 24-year-old Qusai Alkafaween, had been brought to the hospital by Orland Park emergency services earlier that day for a possible overdose and had been discharged but was refusing to leave. When the officers arrived, Alkafaween was exhibiting alternating calm and erratic behavior that both officers recognized as signs of a mental health crisis. After approximately 14 minutes of conversation in which Alkafaween could not or would not provide his home address or identify anyone to call, Officer Klepk drove Alkafaween to the parking lot of a closed restaurant near the Will County–Cook County line in Orland Park and left him there around 11:25 p.m.
Approximately 45 minutes later, Alkafaween was struck by a vehicle while walking in the roadway on Wolf Road near the drop-off location and was severely injured. Body camera footage captured the encounter in full. Sergeant Dileto, while still at the hospital after the drop-off, told hospital staff he was having the officer “dump” Alkafaween at the county line and hoped Alkafaween would not “ping pong” back. Dileto later received a written reprimand for the location chosen for the drop-off and for his language to hospital staff. Dileto also failed to include information about Alkafaween being struck by a vehicle in his police report or notify supervisors.
In October 2021, Alkafaween filed a civil tort action against the Village of New Lenox, the two officers, Silver Cross Hospital, and treating medical personnel. The Silver Cross defendants settled. In the operative second amended complaint, Alkafaween alleged willful and wanton conduct against the Village defendants, citing a detailed list of omissions — including failure to check his driver’s license for his address, failure to contact a social worker or superior officers, failure to bring him to a place of safety, and the instruction to walk north on Wolf Road at midnight. The Village defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing absolute immunity under section 4-102 of the Illinois Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. The trial court agreed, finding the encounter had transitioned from law enforcement to a community caretaking function when the officers offered Alkafaween a ride, and granted summary judgment. Alkafaween appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Third District reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the officers were engaged in “police protection service” under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act — which provides absolute immunity with no willful-and-wanton exception — or were “executing or enforcing the law” under section 2-202, which provides only limited immunity and does not shield willful and wanton conduct. Because reasonable persons could draw different inferences from the undisputed facts, the court held that summary judgment was improper.
The court identified facts cutting in each direction. Supporting police protection or community caretaking: the officers never arrested, detained, or handcuffed Alkafaween; they maintained calm and conversational tones throughout; they repeatedly tried to arrange a ride for him; Alkafaween appeared to consent to the ride; and the supervising officer testified the conduct was a community caretaking function. Supporting law enforcement or execution of law: the officers were dispatched on a criminal trespass call; hospital staff had indicated Alkafaween was refusing to leave (an element of criminal trespass under Illinois law); security guards — not medical staff — were monitoring Alkafaween on arrival; and plaintiff’s police-procedure expert testified the officers were executing or enforcing the law for the entirety of the encounter.
The court reaffirmed the general rule that the question of which immunity provision applies is ordinarily one of fact for the trier of fact, resolvable as a matter of law only when the facts support a single conclusion. Here, the facts did not support only one conclusion, and the trial court erred in resolving the issue on summary judgment.
Key Takeaways
- Illinois’s section 4-102 “police protection” immunity is absolute — it has no willful-and-wanton exception — whereas section 2-202 “execution or enforcement of law” immunity is limited, leaving officers exposed for willful and wanton conduct; the distinction is therefore outcome-determinative in cases involving egregious police conduct.
- Whether an officer is providing police protection versus enforcing the law is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury; a court may decide it as a matter of law only when the evidence points to a single conclusion.
- A dispatch on a criminal trespass call does not automatically fix the nature of the entire subsequent encounter; courts must examine how the interaction actually unfolded, not merely how it began.
- Statements and conduct of officers — such as Dileto’s comment about “dumping” Alkafaween at the county line and his failure to document the subsequent accident — are relevant evidence that a trier of fact may consider in characterizing the nature of the police activity.
Why It Matters
This decision underscores the limits of section 4-102 absolute immunity as a summary-judgment shield when police conduct arguably transitions from caretaking to enforcement — or blurs the line between the two. Municipal defendants cannot simply characterize a police encounter as “community caretaking” to obtain absolute immunity where the facts, including dispatch records, officer statements, and expert testimony, permit a contrary inference. Attorneys litigating police-conduct claims in Illinois should pay close attention to the factual record surrounding how and why a police activity was initiated and how it evolved, as those distinctions determine which immunity tier applies.
The case also highlights a recurring tension in police encounters with individuals experiencing apparent mental health crises: officers may simultaneously be perceived as providing assistance and enforcing a law (here, criminal trespass), and the characterization carries significant legal consequences for injured plaintiffs. Given the severity of Alkafaween’s injuries and the documented officer statements, the remand sets up a trial at which a jury will decide both the immunity question and, if section 2-202 applies, whether the officers’ conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton misconduct.