Background
Ernest C. Withers — the celebrated photographer known for documenting the Civil Rights Movement — died in October 2007, leaving behind a trust holding real property and his extensive photography library. After his wife’s death in 2008, their daughter Rosalind Withers became trustee. Disputes between Rosalind and her brother Andrew were long-running: a 2012 settlement agreement in Shelby County chancery court barred Andrew from challenging Rosalind’s authority as trustee or seeking to terminate the trust. Andrew nonetheless filed a new complaint in April 2018 seeking Rosalind’s removal, alleging breaches of fiduciary duty, conversion of trust assets, failure to provide accountings, and self-dealing — including using trust funds to pay for her housing and automobile.
The chancery court judge assigned to the case recused himself after entering an initial order, and all three chancellors in the 30th Judicial District signed a recusal order. A follow-up order “transferred” the case to Division 5 of the Shelby County Circuit Court, where it was assigned to Judge Rhynette Hurd. The circuit court allowed Andrew to proceed on an amended complaint, and in August 2024 entered an order removing Rosalind as trustee and appointing a successor.
Rosalind and the Withers Collection, Inc. moved to set aside the judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The circuit court denied that motion, reasoning that the case had been transferred “by interchange” and that it independently had jurisdiction because the action was styled as a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claim. Defendants appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals vacated all orders entered by the circuit court and remanded with directions to transfer the case back to the chancery court. The court held that Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-203(1) of the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code grants chancery and probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings “concerning the administration of a trust,” and that Andrew’s claims — however styled — squarely fell within that category. Analyzing the nature of the causes of action, the relief sought, and the statutory provisions relied upon, the court found that every element of the complaint required assessment of the trustee’s conduct in administering the trust, interpretation of the trust instrument, and application of trust-specific statutes such as § 35-15-802. The circuit court’s contrary reasoning — that the declaratory-judgment label placed the case outside trust-administration jurisdiction — was rejected as inconsistent with the TUTC, which expressly identifies “an action to declare rights” as a matter involving trust administration.
The court further held that the transfer order did not effectuate a proper interchange. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B and Rule 11 § VII(c), a circuit judge may hear a chancery matter only by sitting in the chancery court by interchange — physically and procedurally acting as a chancellor — not by receiving a transferred case. The record showed the opposite: the docket number was changed to a circuit court number, all orders bore the circuit court caption and were filed with the circuit court clerk, and no order designated Judge Hurd to sit by interchange or to act in the capacity of a chancellor. Because the circuit court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction, its orders were void ab initio.
Because the case had originally been filed in the correct court and was transferred through no fault of any party, the court declined to dismiss the action outright. Instead it remanded with instructions for the case to be transferred back to chancery court, directing the Presiding Judge to designate a sitting chancellor — or, if necessary, another judge properly sitting by interchange — to hear the matter.
Key Takeaways
- Tennessee Code Annotated § 35-15-203(1) vests exclusive jurisdiction over trust-administration proceedings in chancery and probate courts; the label placed on a complaint (e.g., “declaratory judgment”) does not override that statutory grant.
- The phrase “concerning the administration of a trust” is broad: any proceeding requiring a court to assess a trustee’s conduct, interpret the trust instrument, or grant remedies such as trustee removal or an accounting falls within the exclusive grant.
- A proper interchange requires the circuit (or other) judge to be designated to sit in the chancery court, acting as a chancellor — a case transfer order that simply reassigns the case to another court’s docket does not accomplish an interchange and does not carry chancery jurisdiction with it.
- Orders entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction are void and must be vacated regardless of the merits; but where the original filing was proper, Tennessee courts may remand for transfer rather than outright dismissal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that practitioners handling trust disputes in Tennessee must carefully attend to the jurisdictional gateway of § 35-15-203(1). Attempting to circumvent chancery court by framing trust claims as declaratory-judgment or damages actions in circuit court will not succeed — the substance of the controversy, not its caption, controls. Attorneys managing multi-year trust litigation should confirm at the outset, and monitor throughout, that the court in which they are proceeding has the statutory authority to act.
The case also provides a practical lesson on judicial interchange mechanics. When a chancellor recuses and no other chancellor in the district is available, the solution is a formal interchange designation that has the replacement judge sit as a chancellor in the chancery court — not an order that transfers the file to a different court altogether. Failure to follow that procedure means years of litigation, and any resulting judgment, may be swept away on jurisdictional grounds no matter how well-founded the underlying merits.