Background
The appellant, an NGO called “Lawyers for the Promotion of Proper Administration,” submitted a Freedom of Information request in July 2023 to the Binyamina-Givat Ada Local Council seeking documents related to the appointment of the council’s internal auditor, Najib Mansour (the third respondent). The request specifically sought the minutes of the selection committee that chose him and his candidacy materials, including his curriculum vitae. The stated purpose was to verify that the auditor satisfied the mandatory threshold qualifications for the position — oversight the appellant characterized as part of its broader public mission to ensure lawful administration in local authorities.
The council provided some requested documents but refused to disclose the committee minutes and the candidacy file, citing the Privacy Protection Law 5741-1981 as prohibiting their release. The appellant petitioned the Haifa District Court, which dismissed the petition in July 2024 and ordered the appellant to pay the respondents NIS 15,000 in costs. The district court found that the candidacy documents fell within the privacy exemptions under sections 9(a)(3) and 9(a)(4) of the Freedom of Information Law 5758-1998, and that the committee minutes were shielded by the internal-deliberations exemption under section 9(b)(4) of the same law. Critically, the lower court characterized the FOI request as a “fishing expedition to uncover flaws” in auditor appointments across local authorities generally, and held that such requests could only succeed if the petitioner first presented a factual basis — or at least a prima facie showing — of an actual defect in the appointment process.
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court in December 2024. At the hearing on May 3, 2026, the Supreme Court recommended that the appellant withdraw its demand for the committee minutes, which the appellant accepted. The council then agreed, consistent with the court’s further recommendation, to provide a paraphrase of the auditor’s CV containing his relevant educational qualifications and work experience. With the concrete dispute thus resolved by agreement, the court did not rule on the merits, but issued extensive guidance on the applicable legal principles given the general importance of the questions raised.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for a unanimous panel (Justices Grosskopf, Stein, and Ronen), the Supreme Court partially accepted the appeal by consent and annulled the district court’s judgment, including the costs order against the appellant. The council was ordered to pay the appellant NIS 10,000 in appeal costs, with the court crediting the council’s willingness to accept the settlement proposal in setting that amount. The council undertook to provide a paraphrase of the auditor’s CV disclosing his relevant academic credentials and professional experience.
While the settlement mooted the need for a merits ruling, the court stated plainly that the district court had erred on both its characterization and its legal standard. The Freedom of Information Law’s default position is disclosure: a requester need show no personal stake in the information, and the burden of justifying refusal rests on the authority. Even when a recognized exception applies — such as the privacy or internal-deliberations exemptions — section 17(d) of the law empowers a court to order disclosure whenever the public interest in release outweighs the reason for refusal. The public interest here was clear: the internal auditor holds a sensitive and consequential position, and the public is entitled to verify that the person appointed meets the mandatory threshold qualifications. The educational background and professional history voluntarily submitted by a candidate for a senior public post are not the kind of private information whose disclosure causes serious harm, and a person who seeks such a position is presumed to accept that, if appointed, the basic credentials qualifying them for the role will be made known to the public.
The court expressly rejected the district court’s requirement that a FOI requester demonstrate a pre-existing factual basis for suspecting a flaw in an appointment process before being entitled to information about that process. Such a requirement inverts the logic of the Freedom of Information Law: the very purpose of the request is to determine whether any flaw exists in the first place. Characterizing civic oversight of public appointments as a suspicious “fishing expedition” rather than commendable democratic participation was, the court said, the root error underlying the lower court’s decision.
Key Takeaways
- Under Israel’s Freedom of Information Law, disclosure is the default and refusal is the exception; a requester has no obligation to demonstrate personal interest or a pre-existing suspicion of wrongdoing.
- The general educational qualifications and relevant work experience of a person appointed to a senior public position are presumptively subject to disclosure; candidates for such posts are deemed to consent to publication of the basic credentials that qualify them for the role.
- Courts may order disclosure even where a statutory exemption applies if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the reason for withholding, and the internal-auditor appointment — a particularly sensitive municipal function — carries substantial public interest in transparency.
- The Supreme Court called on public authorities to proactively publish the professional backgrounds of their senior officers (including director-general, treasurer, legal adviser, city engineer, department heads, and internal auditor) on accessible websites, without waiting for FOI requests.
Why It Matters
This decision pushes back firmly against a judicial tendency to treat Freedom of Information requests skeptically when they target personnel processes, reaffirming that such requests are a legitimate and valued instrument of democratic accountability rather than presumptive harassment. By making clear that no “threshold suspicion” of wrongdoing is required before a citizen may ask whether a public appointee is qualified, the court strengthens the practical utility of Israel’s FOI regime for civil-society oversight.
The court’s call for proactive proactive online disclosure of senior officials’ professional credentials — analogizing to the judiciary’s own practice of publishing judges’ CVs — signals an expectation that transparency norms will evolve beyond reactive responses to individual requests. For local authorities across Israel, this opinion suggests that routine publication of the professional backgrounds of key officeholders is now the expected standard of good administration.