Background
The petitioners, Doron Nisnov and Yitzhak Mordechai, own a property at 47 Meslant Street, Tel Aviv. On 21 September 2025, the Tel Aviv-Jaffa Local Affairs Court (Judge M. Srugovitz) issued a final demolition order against the property under the Planning and Building Law, 5725-1965. The petitioners appealed; the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Judge N. Tabor) dismissed that appeal on 22 February 2026. The petitioners then sought leave to bring a second appeal before the Supreme Court. On 19 May 2026, Justice Alex Stein refused leave, finding that the application raised no principled legal question transcending the petitioners’ private interests and that a second appeal was not required to prevent a miscarriage of justice. That same decision denied their requests for a stay of execution and to introduce additional evidence.
Following the denial of leave, the petitioners filed the present application under Section 254ט(א)(1) of the Planning and Building Law, asking for a 180-day extension before the demolition order must be carried out. They grounded the request in a sudden and serious deterioration in the health of both petitioners, supported by medical documentation. The respondent, the Local Planning and Building Committee Tel Aviv, opposed any stay, arguing that the petitioners had not demonstrated the “special reason” required by Section 254ט(ד)(1) of the Law and that a 180-day delay was in any event disproportionately long.
The respondent also raised a preliminary jurisdictional question: which court is competent to hear a stay application under Section 254ט(א)(1) once the Supreme Court has declined leave to appeal? The statute vests jurisdiction in “the last court that heard the matter,” and a conflicting line of authority had recently emerged on how that phrase should be read when the Supreme Court’s involvement was limited to refusing a leave application.
The Court’s Holding
On the jurisdictional question, Justice Stein disagreed with a recent ruling by Justice Chaim Kovo in Sarhan v. Land Enforcement Authority, רע”פ 58509-10-25 (7 January 2026). Justice Kovo had interpreted “heard the matter” to mean “heard substantively,” thereby excluding a Supreme Court dismissal of a third-round leave application that did not examine the merits of the demolition order; on that reading the District Court — the last court to have actually scrutinised the demolition order on appeal — would remain the competent forum for a subsequent stay request. Justice Stein held that the plain text of the statute governs: “the last court that heard the matter” means the most recent court in time to have dealt with the demolition order, and the Supreme Court qualifies even when its involvement was limited to refusing leave on procedural grounds. The fact that the refusal did not engage with the underlying merits of the demolition order is irrelevant to this textual analysis. Justice Stein added that his reading has the practical advantage of sparing the Court the need to phrase leave-refusal decisions with unusual care to avoid any implication about how the District Court should later rule on a stay application. Accordingly, the Supreme Court — sitting as a single justice pursuant to Section 26(3) of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984 — has jurisdiction over the present application.
On the merits, Justice Stein found that the documented medical circumstances of each petitioner constitute a sufficient basis for a stay, though not for the full 180 days sought. He granted the application in part, staying execution of the demolition order until 30 September 2026, subject to a condition designed to secure performance.
The stay is conditional on the petitioners depositing with the Supreme Court registry, by 30 June 2026, an autonomous bank guarantee payable on demand, drawn in favour of the Local Planning and Building Committee Tel Aviv, in the amount of NIS 120,000. The guarantee is intended in part to fund the eventual execution of the demolition order should that become necessary. If the guarantee is not deposited by 30 June 2026, the stay lapses automatically without further order.
Key Takeaways
- The phrase “the last court that heard the matter” in Section 254ט(א)(1) of the Planning and Building Law bears its literal meaning: it is the most recent court to have handled the demolition-order proceedings, including the Supreme Court when it has only refused leave to appeal on procedural grounds — contrary to the approach taken by Justice Kovo in Sarhan.
- A sudden and documented deterioration in the health of both property owners can constitute a “special reason” justifying a partial stay of a final demolition order, even after all appeal avenues have been exhausted.
- Where a stay is granted on humanitarian grounds, the court may require an autonomous bank guarantee as a condition, sized to cover the cost of ultimately executing the order, with an automatic forfeiture mechanism if the guarantee is not furnished within a short deadline.
- The decision creates an express judicial disagreement between two Supreme Court justices on the jurisdictional question, signalling that the issue may require resolution by a larger bench or legislative clarification.
Why It Matters
The ruling directly addresses a live split of authority within the Supreme Court on which forum has jurisdiction to entertain stay requests after a third-round leave refusal — a question with practical consequences in every contested demolition-order case that reaches the Supreme Court and is turned away. By opting for the literal reading, Justice Stein places that jurisdiction firmly with the Supreme Court rather than returning it to the District Court, centralising post-exhaustion relief and potentially discouraging tactical leave applications filed primarily to shift the stay forum.
The decision also illustrates the narrow but real pathway that remains open to owners facing final demolition orders: demonstrating a sudden, well-documented medical emergency can still secure a limited reprieve, even after every substantive appellate avenue has been closed. The requirement of a substantial autonomous bank guarantee as a precondition ensures that this humanitarian flexibility does not come at the expense of enforcement certainty for planning authorities.