Background
On the night of June 11, 2022, Hardeman County Sheriff’s Office deputies attempted to stop Danterrio Devonta Poplar after observing him driving without a seatbelt and with non-functioning tag lights. Rather than comply, Poplar accelerated to approximately seventy miles per hour, crossed a double yellow line to pass another vehicle — forcing an oncoming car off the road — and ultimately crashed through an intersection, striking a stop sign, a handrail, and a light pole. Two young children, ages eight and one, were found unrestrained in the back seat. After his arrest, Poplar spontaneously told officers he fled because he knew his license was suspended and his tag light was out.
A Hardeman County grand jury indicted Poplar on one count of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle while creating a risk of death or injury to others. At trial, Poplar testified in his own defense, denying he tried to flee and attributing the crash to brake failure. The jury rejected that account and convicted him as charged. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard offender to three years, with seventy-five days of incarceration and the balance on supervised probation.
On appeal, Poplar argued that the prosecutor committed reversible error by vouching for the credibility of the two officer-witnesses. The challenged statements included: a voir dire remark that the prosecutor “know[s] these guys” and “trust[s] them”; a rebuttal statement that he works with police every day and is “pretty defensive” of them; a reference to the officers as “my cops”; and a comment that he would “love to tell” the jury what the speedometer read but would keep silent because the reading was not in evidence.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction on all grounds. As to the preserved “pretty defensive” statement, the court held that the remark did not constitute impermissible vouching. Applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court distinguished the comment from the express, unambiguous assurances of personal knowledge condemned in State v. Goltz — statements such as being “100 percent confident” or knowing “for a fact” that a witness was honest. The prosecutor here did not tell the jury the officers were truthful, did not claim personal knowledge confirming their testimony, and did not ask the jury to credit them on that basis. Read in context, the remark explained the prosecutor’s tone in responding to a credibility attack rather than offering a personal guaranty of witness veracity. The court also rejected Poplar’s argument that the trial court should have given a curative instruction, noting that defense counsel never requested one after the court denied the mistrial motion and invited further relief.
The court reviewed the three unpreserved statements — the voir dire remark, the “my cops” comment, and the speedometer statement — under the plain error doctrine. The voir dire challenge failed at the fourth plain error factor because defense counsel admitted at the new-trial hearing that he deliberately chose not to object in order to keep proceedings moving. That admission of tactical silence disqualifies a defendant from plain error relief under Tennessee precedent. As to the “my cops” and speedometer remarks, the court assumed without deciding that they may have been improper but held that Poplar could not satisfy the fifth plain error factor — the requirement that consideration of the error be necessary to do substantial justice. Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including Poplar’s own spontaneous post-arrest admission, there was no significant probability the jury would have acquitted him absent the challenged remarks.
Key Takeaways
- A prosecutor’s statement that he is “pretty defensive” of officers he works with daily does not cross into impermissible vouching when it explains the prosecutor’s tone in responding to a credibility attack rather than expressly assuring the jury that the officers are truthful or invoking personal knowledge beyond the record.
- Plain error review is unavailable when counsel’s failure to object was a deliberate tactical choice; a defense attorney’s admission that he chose not to object to keep the case moving forward squarely bars the fourth plain error factor.
- Even assuming prosecutorial remarks in closing were improper, plain error relief requires a showing of significant probability that the jury would have acquitted absent the error — a burden not met where the defendant made a spontaneous post-arrest admission and the physical evidence strongly corroborated the officers’ account.
- A defendant who does not request a curative instruction after the trial court denies a mistrial motion and invites further relief cannot fault the court on appeal for failing to give one sua sponte.
Why It Matters
This decision provides a useful framework for distinguishing impermissible vouching from permissible advocacy in Tennessee. The court’s contextual analysis — focusing on whether the prosecutor expressly asserted personal knowledge of witness truthfulness rather than merely explaining a rhetorical posture — gives trial courts and practitioners concrete guidance on where the line falls. It also reinforces that stock phrases like “my cops” or expressions of professional solidarity with law enforcement, while inadvisable, will not automatically require reversal absent a direct assurance of credibility.
The opinion further underscores the high stakes of contemporaneous objection practice. Defense counsel’s candid admission that he skipped an objection for strategic convenience not only waived plenary review but foreclosed plain error relief entirely. Combined with the court’s reaffirmation that plain error is reserved for errors of magnitude sufficient to probably change the outcome, the case illustrates how a combination of substantial guilt evidence and procedural default can insulate a conviction even where a prosecutor’s rhetoric pushes against professional conduct norms.