Note: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Background
In the early morning hours of May 29, 2017, Uladzimir Marozau entered the Highland Park, Illinois home of N.L., the estranged wife of his close friend Dmitry Levites, who was then subject to an order of protection barring him from the residence. Marozau attacked N.L. in her bedroom, dragged her down the stairs by her hair, and attempted to force her into a waiting car — all while reportedly directing his accomplice to go inside and “grab the baby.” Neighbors intervened and police arrived before N.L. could be removed. A backpack Marozau had stashed nearby was later recovered and found to contain computers, hard drives, and cocaine.
Following a bench trial in Lake County Circuit Court, Marozau was convicted of three counts of home invasion and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. The trial court acquitted him of residential burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and kidnapping. At trial, defense counsel — Vadim Glozman and the Zeit brothers — pursued a consent-based defense, arguing that Dmitry had given Marozau a locksmith-cut key and authority to enter the home. Marozau also testified that he believed N.L. was a terrorist and that he went to the house to expose her. The trial court found him wholly incredible.
After sentencing, new counsel filed a supplemental motion for a new trial arguing that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and present an insanity defense. At a post-trial evidentiary hearing, the defense presented Dr. Kara Anast, a clinical psychologist who diagnosed Marozau with a “provisional delusional disorder of the persecutory type” and opined that his paranoid thinking played a significant role in his conduct. The State countered with Dr. Robert Hanlon, a neuropsychologist who diagnosed a mixed personality disorder but concluded that Marozau did not lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Trial counsel Douglas Zeit testified that insanity was discussed and collectively rejected as a viable strategy; the team believed the consent/authorization defense was appropriate and that Marozau agreed.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District affirmed on all grounds. First, it held that Marozau forfeited any ineffective-assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to raise a fitness-to-stand-trial issue, because the argument was not preserved below in the form presented on appeal. Second, although the insanity-based ineffective-assistance claim was preserved, the court found it meritless under both prongs of Strickland. Counsel’s performance was not deficient because, after extensive discussions with Marozau himself, they made a reasonable strategic choice to present the consent/authorization defense — a choice Marozau approved. The court emphasized that counsel considered and rejected insanity as not viable given the circumstances.
The court also found no prejudice. Even if counsel had pursued an insanity defense, Marozau could not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The trial record — including Marozau’s own statements to police that he wanted to act legally, his deliberate steps to avoid detection (hiding his phone, having the car parked out of sight, stashing a backpack beforehand), and Dr. Hanlon’s expert opinion — affirmatively undermined any claim that Marozau lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the offense.
Finally, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a retrospective fitness hearing. There was no bona fide doubt as to Marozau’s fitness: the record showed he understood the nature of the proceedings and was able to assist in his own defense throughout. His active involvement in trial strategy discussions and his coherent — if unbelievable — trial testimony confirmed as much.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s failure to properly preserve a distinct ineffective-assistance argument in post-trial proceedings results in forfeiture on appeal, even when related claims are preserved.
- Trial counsel’s strategic decision to forgo an insanity defense in favor of a consent/authorization defense — reached after extensive deliberation with the defendant — satisfies the first Strickland prong when counsel reasonably investigated and rejected the alternative theory.
- To establish prejudice on an insanity-based IAC claim, the record must affirmatively suggest the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct; a provisional diagnosis of delusional disorder, standing alone, is insufficient when the defendant took deliberate steps to avoid detection and expressed awareness of legal limits.
- A retrospective fitness hearing is not required absent a bona fide doubt — evidence that the defendant could not understand the proceedings or assist in his defense — and active, coherent participation in trial strategy can negate that doubt.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the high bar defendants face when arguing that trial counsel should have pursued an insanity defense instead of a chosen strategy. Courts will not second-guess a considered, client-approved strategic choice simply because a post-trial expert identifies a potential mental-health theory. The opinion reinforces that the prejudice inquiry is fact-specific: a defendant who masked his movements, discarded his phone to avoid tracking, and told police he wanted to act within the law will face serious difficulty showing he lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.
Practitioners should also note the court’s pointed reminder that Rule 341(h)(6) requires an appellant’s brief to accurately set out all material facts — including the State’s evidence — not just facts favorable to the appellant. Omitting witness testimony that bears directly on the prejudice analysis drew a formal caution from the panel.