Background
The Lind family owns Lot 327 in a 1938 Wells, Maine subdivision and holds title to property burdened by a ten-foot-wide right-of-way that runs along the boundary between their lot and the abutting Blomgren parcel. Five feet of the easement lies on each lot. The right-of-way leads to a cement bulkhead and stairway providing pedestrian access to the Webhannet River. The neighboring plaintiffs — Richard Lytle, Sandra Lytle, and Gregg Wilson — hold easement rights over the right-of-way, which they use to carry water-sports equipment such as kayaks and paddleboards to the river. Wilson’s deed expressly grants a right-of-way over the subdivision’s ways and avenues; the Lytles were found to hold an implied easement and an easement under Maine’s “paper streets” statutes. The Linds do not dispute that the easement burdens their property.
On May 22, 2023, the Linds installed a split-rail fence within the right-of-way running parallel to and along the center of the easement, effectively dividing the ten-foot-wide corridor into two five-foot-wide lanes. The Linds also constructed a driveway partly within the right-of-way. The neighbors filed suit in October 2023 seeking a declaratory judgment that the fence and parked vehicles unreasonably interfered with their easement rights, along with injunctive relief. The Superior Court denied a preliminary injunction and, on cross-motions for summary judgment, ruled in favor of the Linds on the fence issue — finding that the neighbors could still access the river despite the fence — while ruling for the neighbors on the vehicle-parking issue.
The neighbors appealed the fence ruling. The parties stipulated to dismissal of a separate claim about the driveway’s grade, resulting in a final judgment that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed de novo.
The Court’s Holding
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Superior Court’s summary judgment in favor of the Linds and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the neighbors on the fence issue. The court held that the split-rail fence unreasonably interferes with the neighbors’ easement rights as a matter of law. The Superior Court’s reasoning — that the fence did not constitute unreasonable interference because the neighbors could still reach the river — was legal error. Maine law has consistently held since Rotch v. Livingston, 91 Me. 461 (1898), that easement holders have the full right to use the entire width of a right-of-way and are not limited to what is merely necessary or convenient.
Relying on Kinderhaus N. LLC v. Nicolas, 2024 ME 34, the court reasoned that, like trees within a right-of-way that forced users to zigzag and use only a portion of the easement, the Linds’ fence forces easement holders to use only part of the right-of-way and prevents them from traversing its full width. A fence running down the center of the easement transforms a single ten-foot corridor into two five-foot lanes, physically occupies easement space, and restricts the width of objects — such as kayaks and paddleboards — that the easement would otherwise accommodate. This constitutes an unreasonable interference regardless of whether some degree of river access remains available.
The court distinguished its earlier decision in Mill Pond Condo. Ass’n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, which had permitted a small sign within an easement. There, the sign was placed in a remote corner of the easement that could not reasonably be used for ingress or egress. Here, the fence was placed squarely in the center of the travel path — an area plainly intended for passage — making Mill Pond‘s limited exception inapplicable. The case was remanded for adjudication of the neighbors’ claim for injunctive relief.
Key Takeaways
- An easement holder’s right to use the full width of a right-of-way is not satisfied merely because some passage remains possible; servient estate owners may not erect permanent structures that deprive dominant estate holders of any portion of the defined easement corridor.
- A fence running down the center of a right-of-way is unreasonable interference as a matter of law, because it splits the easement into narrower lanes and physically occupies space within the easement, even if pedestrians can still squeeze through.
- The narrow Mill Pond exception — permitting objects within an easement that do not obstruct ingress or egress — applies only to structures placed in portions of the easement that cannot reasonably serve as a travel path, not to obstructions within the central travel corridor.
- Maine’s paper-streets statutes (23 M.R.S. §§ 3027, 3031; 33 M.R.S. § 460) can establish easement rights for subdivision lot owners whose deeds lack an express easement grant.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces Maine’s longstanding rule that servient estate owners bear a strict obligation not to impair or diminish the usable width of a right-of-way, even incrementally. By making clear that the “mere access” standard applied by the trial court is legally insufficient, the court signals that physical intrusions into the defined bounds of an easement — fences, plantings, structures — will be evaluated against the easement holder’s right to the full described width, not merely against whether some path to the destination survives.
The ruling has practical significance for property owners in Maine’s many historic subdivision communities, where platted rights-of-way provide access to water and other shared amenities. Lot owners and their counsel should understand that installing fences, landscaping features, or other improvements within a right-of-way corridor — even with good intentions — can constitute unreasonable interference as a matter of law, exposing them to injunctive relief requiring removal.