Background
Donald Freese was charged with several crimes arising from a September 2020 incident. In August 2023, the New Hampshire Superior Court found him not competent to stand trial but with potential for restoration within twelve months. After a contested evidentiary hearing in August 2024, the court found that Freese had not been restored to competency and accordingly dismissed the criminal charges without prejudice under RSA 135:17-a, IV. Finding him dangerous, the court also ordered him held for up to ninety days to allow the State to pursue civil commitment.
During the civil commitment evaluation process, a new evaluator concluded in November 2024 that Freese does not have a mental illness and is not dangerous — a finding at odds with the prior competency determination. The State moved to reconsider the September 2024 incompetency finding, and the trial court, now persuaded there was “a substantial question about whether the defendant ever was incompetent to stand trial or whether he has been malingering,” vacated the dismissal and reinstated the indictments. The trial court scheduled further competency proceedings. Freese sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
The certified question was whether a trial court may reinstate indictments that were dismissed by operation of law under RSA 135:17-a, IV, based on new information — surfaced during a post-dismissal dangerousness evaluation — suggesting the defendant may have feigned incompetency.
The Court’s Holding
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed unanimously, holding that the trial court lacked statutory authority to reinstate the dismissed indictments. Applying de novo review and plain-meaning statutory construction, the court emphasized that RSA 135:17-a, IV uses mandatory language: once a defendant is found not restored to competency after twelve months, the criminal case “shall be dismissed without prejudice.” That mandate expressly limits any further action on the criminal matter, including reinstatement of charges.
The court rejected the notion that the trial court’s inherent authority could fill the gap. Citing established New Hampshire precedent, the court reiterated that inherent authority cannot be invoked to contravene clear statutory limitations. Just as a court may not use inherent authority to extend a statutory limitations period, it may not use that authority to undo a dismissal that the legislature has made mandatory. The court observed that RSA 135:17-a carefully delineates what may happen after dismissal — a 90-day detention for civil commitment evaluation (subsection V) and, if involuntarily admitted, a further competency evaluation (subsection VI) — and reinstatement of criminal indictments is not among those authorized steps.
The court therefore reversed the reinstatement order and remanded the case, with four justices concurring and the Chief Justice recused after oral argument.
Key Takeaways
- Under RSA 135:17-a, IV, dismissal of criminal charges after a failed competency restoration is mandatory and cuts off the trial court’s authority to revisit the criminal proceedings, even when new evidence suggests the defendant may have been malingering.
- A trial court’s inherent authority cannot override an express statutory mandate; where the legislature has prescribed a specific procedural outcome — here, dismissal — courts may not improvise an alternative remedy such as reinstatement of indictments.
- The post-dismissal statutory scheme (RSA 135:17-a, V and VI) provides limited, enumerated avenues for further proceedings, confined to civil commitment and, if admitted, a subsequent competency re-evaluation — not restoration of criminal charges.
- Defendants found not competent and not restored after twelve months obtain a dismissal without prejudice, meaning the State retains the option to refile if the limitations period has not run, but may not simply have existing indictments reinstated.
Why It Matters
This decision draws a firm line between the criminal and civil tracks that govern incompetent defendants in New Hampshire. Once a case is dismissed under the competency statute, trial courts have no authority — statutory or inherent — to pull it back into the criminal docket based on second-guessing a prior incompetency finding, even when a later evaluation raises serious malingering concerns. Defense practitioners can rely on the mandatory dismissal as a genuine termination of the criminal case rather than a procedural placeholder subject to reconsideration.
For prosecutors and policymakers, the ruling highlights a potential gap in the statutory framework: if a defendant successfully feigns incompetency through the twelve-month restoration period, the State’s recourse lies in refiling charges (subject to the statute of limitations) rather than reinstating the original indictments. Legislatures concerned about malingering may need to address this scenario expressly if they wish to permit a different outcome.