Background
In January 2022, sixteen-month-old D.G. was left in the care of Rahsaan Strawder, who had been dating the child’s mother for roughly three months. When the mother returned home after dropping other children at school, D.G. was unresponsive on Strawder’s couch with a visible mark on her head. The child was taken to the hospital and later died. An autopsy performed by forensic pathologist Dr. Amanda Youmans concluded D.G. died from blunt force head trauma caused by physical abuse, with findings — subdural hematoma, brain swelling, and retinal hemorrhages — consistent with a shaking episode combined with blunt impact.
A jailhouse witness, William Borsch, testified that Strawder confided he had struck D.G. with a pillow, held the pillow over her face to muffle her crying, then picked her up by one leg and shook her. Strawder was charged with two counts of first degree murder and two counts of aggravated battery. He waived a jury and proceeded to a bench trial in March 2025. The trial court found him not guilty on the counts involving striking D.G. against a hard surface but guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery premised on shaking, crediting both Dr. Youmans’s medical findings and Borsch’s account. Strawder was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Strawder argued solely that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to rebut Dr. Youmans and to challenge the scientific reliability of shaken baby syndrome and abusive-head-trauma diagnoses. He cited scientific literature and out-of-state decisions questioning those diagnoses, contending the evidence was closely balanced and that the absence of a defense expert prejudiced him.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth District affirmed the conviction. Applying the two-prong Strickland v. Washington standard, the court declined to reach the merits of the ineffective-assistance claim, concluding instead that the record on direct appeal was insufficient to adjudicate it. The court noted that nothing in the appellate record revealed whether defense counsel had considered retaining an expert, and Strawder himself offered no indication of what a defense expert would actually have said about the specific facts of the case.
The court emphasized that without knowing whether a qualified expert was available and what that testimony would have been, it could not assess either prong of Strickland — whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether a different result was reasonably probable. Citing People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, and People v. Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, the court held that such claims, which turn on facts outside the trial record, are better resolved through post-conviction collateral proceedings where a fuller evidentiary record can be developed.
Key Takeaways
- An ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to call an expert witness requires a developed record — including what the expert would have testified — before an appellate court can meaningfully evaluate either Strickland prong.
- When that record is absent on direct appeal, Illinois courts will decline to rule on the merits and direct the defendant to raise the claim in post-conviction (collateral) proceedings.
- The selection of expert witnesses is a paradigmatic strategic choice by trial counsel and is not per se ineffective assistance, even in cases involving contested forensic theories such as shaken baby syndrome.
- This opinion is unpublished under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and carries no precedential weight except in the limited circumstances specified by Rule 23(e)(1).
Why It Matters
Challenges to shaken baby syndrome and abusive-head-trauma diagnoses have gained traction in courts across the country, with defendants invoking a growing body of literature questioning the reliability of those findings. Strawder illustrates a procedural hurdle that defendants in Illinois face when raising such challenges through an ineffective-assistance theory on direct appeal: absent a post-trial record showing what a defense expert would have said, the claim will not be decided on its merits and must await collateral review.
For defense practitioners, the case underscores the importance of preserving the record at trial — or at the motion-to-reconsider stage — by identifying and, if possible, proffering a defense expert. Attorneys handling similar convictions on appeal should consider whether a post-conviction petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act offers a more viable vehicle for developing the evidentiary foundation that direct appeal cannot supply.