Note: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Background
On February 1, 2020, Amber Smith was found dead in her Chicago apartment near Humboldt Park, lying face-down in bed with signs of rigor mortis. The medical examiner determined she died by strangulation, finding petechiae on her face and hemorrhaging to her neck consistent with sustained manual compression. Anthony Robinson, who had been dating Smith for four to six months, was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. His DNA was detected on swabs taken from Smith’s neck, vagina, and anus, and cell-site analysis placed his phone at the apartment from approximately 2:30 p.m. until 6:10 p.m. on January 31—after which his phone went dark until 9:30 p.m. Roommate testimony established that no one else entered Smith’s bedroom during the relevant time window.
In a recorded police interview, Robinson admitted he and Smith argued that day about suspicious text messages and her plans to attend a concert with a male friend. He said they “tussled,” then had consensual sex, and that Smith was alive and breathing when he left. At a second interview after his September 2020 arrest, Robinson acknowledged choking Smith during sex and demonstrated placing his hands on her neck. The defense theory at trial was that Smith died from a “sexual accident” involving a consensual chokehold. The jury rejected that theory and convicted Robinson of first-degree murder; the circuit court sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment.
Before trial, the circuit court admitted evidence of four prior incidents of violence and threats involving Robinson’s ex-girlfriend Verlia Jones under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4(a), Illinois’s domestic-violence propensity statute. Those incidents included Robinson punching Jones on Father’s Day 2015, pushing her and then sending detailed death threats in late 2015, strangling her in April 2017 (to which Robinson pleaded guilty to battery), and sending threatening texts and voicemails in 2018. During trial, co-defense counsel Bertacchi fell ill and was hospitalized; the circuit court denied repeated motions for a mistrial, finding lead counsel Placek more than capable of continuing alone.
The Court’s Holding
The Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the conviction and 50-year sentence on all four grounds raised by Robinson. On ineffective assistance, the court found that lead counsel Placek—described by the trial judge as surpassing 95 to 99 percent of lawyers appearing before that court—provided constitutionally adequate representation despite Bertacchi’s mid-trial illness, and that Robinson failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or resulting prejudice under Strickland. The court similarly upheld the denial of the mistrial motions: Bertacchi had not examined witnesses, delivered an opening statement, or appeared ill in front of the jury, and Placek had adequate time to prepare defense witnesses before the case-in-chief.
On the other-crimes evidence, the court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting all four Jones incidents under section 115-7.4(a). The court found that the incidents were sufficiently proximate in time, that the third incident—in which Robinson strangled Jones—was “extremely similar” to the charged offense, and that the probative value of showing propensity, motive, intent, and modus operandi outweighed any unfair prejudice. When Jones spontaneously testified to an attempt to throw her off a bridge—a fact not included in the State’s pretrial offer of proof—the circuit court appropriately struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it rather than declaring a mistrial.
On the sentencing challenge, Robinson argued that the trial court relied on a factual misstatement as an aggravating factor when it said there was “no evidence that they made love that day” despite the presence of semen. The appellate court found that, viewed in context, the trial judge’s comment was directed at the insufficiency of evidence supporting the accidental-chokehold defense theory rather than a finding of fact used in aggravation, and that the 50-year sentence was otherwise supported by the record, including the four documented acts of prior domestic violence.
Key Takeaways
- Illinois’s domestic-violence propensity statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7.4(a)) permits admission of prior incidents of intimate-partner violence to show propensity, motive, intent, and modus operandi, and courts have broad discretion in weighing probative value against prejudice when those incidents involve strangulation similar to the charged offense.
- A co-counsel’s mid-trial medical emergency does not automatically entitle a defendant to a mistrial; courts will look to whether remaining counsel is competent and prepared, and whether the absent attorney performed any material trial functions before falling ill.
- When a witness unexpectedly offers other-crimes testimony that exceeds the scope of a pretrial ruling, striking the testimony and instructing the jury to disregard it is an adequate remedy—a mistrial is not required absent a showing that the curative instruction was insufficient.
- A sentencing court’s characterization of the evidence, even if imprecise, will not automatically constitute reversible error if it does not amount to a clearly improper aggravating factor and the overall record supports the sentence imposed.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the broad reach of Illinois’s domestic-violence propensity statute in homicide prosecutions where the defendant and victim shared an intimate relationship. Prosecutors can aggregate prior incidents of physical violence, death threats, and threatening communications against former partners to build a propensity case, even where those incidents span several years and involve different victims, provided the court finds them sufficiently proximate and similar to the charged conduct. Defense attorneys handling similar cases should carefully scrutinize each incident proposed for admission and challenge the proximate-time and factual-similarity findings on a granular basis.
The opinion also offers a practical reminder about trial-management rights: defendants do not have a constitutional entitlement to the specific attorney who prepared a particular phase of the case. Where experienced co-counsel can continue competently, courts may deny mistrial motions even when a significant disruption occurs mid-trial. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of ensuring all attorneys of record are meaningfully prepared to carry any phase of the trial independently.