Background
Kevin Charles Lind was charged with human trafficking under Iowa Code section 710A.2(1) (2024), which prohibits knowingly attempting to purchase services involving commercial sexual activity from a victim or another person engaged in human trafficking. The case arose from Lind’s negotiations with a prostitute who represented to him that she would provide a minor for sexual activity in exchange for money.
The case is a companion to State v. Lind (Lind I), decided the same day, which involved an identical charge under the same statute. After the prostitute was deposed, the State conceded that she had been lying — she was never actually going to provide a minor. The State nonetheless maintained that because Lind believed her representations and intended to act on them, he had committed human trafficking by “attempting to purchase” sex services under the statute’s definition.
The Polk County district court granted Lind’s motion to dismiss the human trafficking charge. The State appealed, arguing that Lind’s belief and intent were sufficient to satisfy the statute even though no actual victim or person engaged in human trafficking was ever involved.
The Court’s Holding
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in a per curiam opinion, relying entirely on its analysis in the companion case, Lind I. The court held that the 2024 version of Iowa Code section 710A.2(1) is violated only when a defendant attempts to purchase sex services from an actual victim — defined by statute as a person actually “subjected to human trafficking” — or from another person who is actually engaged in human trafficking.
Because it was undisputed that the prostitute Lind negotiated with was neither an actual victim nor a person actually engaged in human trafficking, the court concluded Lind’s conduct did not satisfy the statutory elements. The defendant’s subjective belief about what he was purchasing, and his intent to act on a fraudulent representation, were insufficient to establish liability under the statute as written.
Key Takeaways
- Iowa’s 2024 human trafficking statute requires that the defendant actually attempt to purchase services from a real victim or a person genuinely engaged in human trafficking — a defendant’s belief or intent alone is not enough.
- A sting or deception scenario in which no actual victim or trafficker exists cannot support a human trafficking charge under Iowa Code section 710A.2(1) as currently written.
- The State’s concession that the intermediary prostitute was never going to provide a minor proved fatal to the charge, even though the factual allegations in the trial information would ordinarily be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss.
Why It Matters
This decision, read alongside its companion Lind I, signals a significant limitation on Iowa’s human trafficking statute as written in 2024: law enforcement cannot use decoy or sting operations to prosecute individuals for human trafficking when no genuine victim or trafficker is part of the transaction. The ruling turns on the plain statutory language requiring an actual victim or actual trafficker, leaving a gap that the legislature may need to address if it intends to reach would-be buyers who are deceived by intermediaries.
Prosecutors pursuing similar cases in Iowa should be aware that charges grounded solely in a suspect’s belief and intent — without a real trafficking victim or trafficker on the other side — will not survive a motion to dismiss under the current statute. The decision underscores the importance of statutory drafting in human trafficking laws, particularly regarding attempt liability and sting-operation scenarios.