Background
Father T.D. has three minor children: two daughters (ages 17 and 13) who split time between Father and their mother, S.C., and a six-year-old son who lived exclusively with Father. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services first became involved with the family in December 2023 after Father physically disciplined his eldest daughter, causing bruising, resulting in an assault charge and dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) petitions for the daughters. In March 2024, the Franklin Family Court adjudicated that Father had neglected or abused his daughters. Although Father was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge, the Cabinet developed a court-approved case plan requiring him to undergo a mental health assessment, complete anger management and domestic violence classes, and cooperate with monthly Cabinet home visits.
Father admitted receiving the case plan in April 2024 and acknowledged that it was adopted by the family court in November 2024 dispositional orders. Despite this, he made no progress on any assigned tasks before February 2025. On February 14, 2025, the Cabinet filed new DNA petitions for all three children, citing Father’s prior domestic violence conviction, his failure to complete the case plan, his refusal to cooperate with the Cabinet, and a statement he had made to his youngest daughter implying he would use a belt on her. The family court granted emergency custody of the son to the Cabinet and placed the daughters with their mother.
An adjudication hearing was held on May 9, 2025, at which the Cabinet presented testimony from the assigned social worker, a psychiatric nurse practitioner who had evaluated the daughters, and Father himself. The family court ruled from the bench, found all three children neglected or abused, and entered adjudication orders on May 12, 2025. After a disposition hearing, the daughters’ DNA cases were closed with custody granted to their mother, while the son remained in temporary Cabinet custody. Father appealed through appointed counsel, who filed an Anders brief conceding no meritorious issues existed and moved to withdraw.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s adjudication orders and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The court identified two errors in the family court’s analysis but found them inconsequential to the ultimate result. First, it held that the family court erred in applying KRS 600.020(1)(a)9 — which deems a child neglected when a parent fails to make sufficient progress on a case plan resulting in the child remaining in foster care for fifteen cumulative months out of forty-eight — because the court improperly struck the foster-care duration requirement from the statutory text. Courts may not subtract from statutory language, and that element was not satisfied here.
Second, the court found that the psychiatric nurse practitioner who diagnosed the daughters with adjustment disorder and anxiety could not qualify as a “qualified mental health professional” under KRS 600.020(52) because the statute requires a minimum of two years of experience and she had only six months. Consequently, her testimony could not support a finding of risk of emotional injury. Similarly, the Cabinet presented no evidence of emotional risk as to the son. The court therefore limited its analysis to the risk-of-physical-injury prong under KRS 600.020(1)(a)2.
On that narrowed ground, the court affirmed. It held that the combination of Father’s prior domestic violence conviction against his son’s mother, his prior adjudication for corporal punishment causing bruising, court-ordered anger management requirements arising from a prior divorce proceeding, complete non-compliance with his case plan, and his threat to use a belt on his youngest daughter elevated the risk of harm well above a “mere theoretical possibility” — satisfying the “actual and reasonable potential for harm” standard required under Kentucky precedent.
Key Takeaways
- KRS 600.020(1)(a)9 requires that a child actually remain in foster care for fifteen cumulative months out of forty-eight before a parent’s case-plan non-compliance can support a neglect finding under that subsection; courts may not excise that element from the statute.
- Expert testimony about emotional injury in a DNA proceeding must come from a “qualified mental health professional” as defined by KRS 600.020(52), which requires at minimum two years of experience — a nurse practitioner with only six months does not qualify.
- A parent’s pattern of domestic violence, prior abuse adjudication, complete failure to comply with a court-approved case plan, and threatening statements toward children can collectively establish an “actual and reasonable potential” for physical harm sufficient to sustain a neglect and abuse finding under KRS 600.020(1)(a)2, even without proof of a new discrete abusive act.
- When appointed counsel files an Anders brief in a Kentucky dependency appeal, the Court of Appeals must independently review the entire record to confirm the absence of nonfrivolous grounds for reversal.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates how Kentucky appellate courts scrutinize the statutory predicates for each neglect and abuse theory even when affirming a result. Practitioners representing the Cabinet should ensure that expert witnesses on emotional injury meet the two-year experience threshold under KRS 600.020(52), and that the specific foster-care duration element of KRS 600.020(1)(a)9 is satisfied before relying on case-plan non-compliance as an independent basis for adjudication. Family courts cannot cure a missing statutory element by redacting it from a form order.
For parents’ counsel, the decision reaffirms that a demonstrated pattern of domestic violence combined with refusal to engage in court-ordered remediation can sustain a physical-risk finding across multiple children — including a child (the son) against whom no independent abuse was alleged — based on the overall household risk the parent presents. The case also offers a practical reminder that an acquittal on criminal charges does not preclude a parallel civil neglect adjudication, as the standards of proof and statutory elements differ significantly.