Background
Kaden Kanae was tried for murder in the second degree and related offenses arising from the September 29, 2018 early-morning shooting of Thomas McCandless, Jr. at Monuments, a landmark in Hale’iwa, O’ahu. At trial, the eyewitness account of the victim’s son—who identified Kanae as the shooter—conflicted with a recorded police interview in which a different man, Alexander Kinney, admitted firing a black revolver. Forensic testimony about bullet trajectory and weapon identification added further complexity, leaving the jury with genuine factual disputes about the identity of the shooter and the weapon used.
After seven days of evidence, the jury began deliberations and within one and a half days sent four communications to the court. The fourth stated the jury was deadlocked. When the trial court asked whether additional time would help, the jury answered unequivocally: “No, more time will not aid the process.” Defense counsel, when consulted, expressed agreement with the court’s inclination to declare a mistrial. The court found manifest necessity and discharged the jury.
Kanae subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds and under State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47 (1982), which grants trial courts discretion to dismiss indictments after repeated hung-jury mistrials. The circuit court denied the motion after entering detailed findings and conclusions, and Kanae appealed. The ICA exercised jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.
The Court’s Holding
The ICA affirmed the denial of Kanae’s motion to dismiss on both grounds. First, the court held that the trial court acted within its broad discretion in finding manifest necessity to discharge the jury. After the jury gave an unequivocal negative response to whether more time would help, no less-severe alternatives were realistically available: the Hawaii Supreme Court has expressly forbidden Allen-type charges under State v. Fajardo, 67 Haw. 593 (1985), and ordering the jury to continue deliberating over its own unequivocal objection would be tantamount to giving such a forbidden instruction. Defense counsel had not requested reinstructing the jury or any other option, and the jury already had its instructions in hand.
Second, the court held that the trial court properly applied the six-factor Moriwake balancing test and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that all factors weighed in favor of retrial rather than dismissal. Because this was only the first mistrial—not the second or third as in Moriwake itself—the circumstances that might warrant dismissal were not present. The court declined to decide whether Kanae had impliedly consented to the mistrial declaration, because the manifest-necessity finding independently foreclosed the double-jeopardy bar to retrial.
Key Takeaways
- A hung-jury mistrial declared after the jury unequivocally states that more time will not help satisfies the “manifest necessity” standard, and the trial court is accorded great deference in making that call.
- In Hawai’i, because Allen-type “dynamite” instructions are forbidden under Fajardo, a court facing a deadlocked jury that says more time is futile may have no less-severe option available—making mistrial the only lawful course.
- Under Moriwake, a single hung-jury mistrial ordinarily weighs in favor of retrial, not dismissal; the doctrine’s equitable relief is most apt after multiple mistrials on essentially the same evidence with no prospect of a different outcome.
- Double jeopardy does not bar retrial where the mistrial was supported by manifest necessity, regardless of whether the defendant consented.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the interplay between Hawai’i’s prohibition on Allen charges and the manifest-necessity doctrine. Defense counsel confronting a deadlocked jury should understand that once the jury says additional time will not help, a court asked to explore “less severe options” may find its hands tied by Fajardo—meaning the path to a double-jeopardy bar is largely foreclosed from that moment forward. Practitioners should raise any desired alternatives (reinstructing, sending the jury home for the night, clarifying a legal question) before the jury reaches that definitive impasse.
The opinion also reinforces that Moriwake relief remains an uphill battle after a single mistrial. Courts applying the six-factor test will focus heavily on the number and nature of prior mistrials; one deadlock of modest length, without more, is unlikely to tip the balance toward dismissal no matter how thin the prosecution’s case may appear.