Note: This decision was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Background
Lance M. Davidson was charged in January 2023 with tampering with a security fire or life safety system — specifically, knowingly sabotaging a security camera at the Montgomery County jail on January 3, 2023, a Class 4 felony under 720 ILCS 5/17-11.5(a). His case was one of three simultaneous criminal matters pending against him. Davidson cycled repeatedly between requesting appointed counsel and invoking his right to self-representation, ultimately proceeding pro se at his second jury trial on May 23, 2023, after a mistrial in the first. The jury found him guilty, and the trial court later sentenced him to three and a half years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, consecutive to a fifty-month sentence imposed in a separate case.
After sentencing, Davidson filed a pro se motion to reconsider his sentence. His appointed counsel, Wesley Poggenpohl — whom Davidson had persistently sought to remove on the ground that Poggenpohl had appeared as a prosecutor against him more than forty times in prior cases — declined to adopt the motion. The trial court permitted Davidson to argue the motion pro se, and it was ultimately denied. On appeal, Davidson raised two issues: first, that he was forced to proceed pro se at a critical stage without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel; and second, that the trial court failed to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry into his pro se claims that both Katherine Drummond and Wesley Poggenpohl had provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Throughout the proceedings, Davidson had filed numerous pro se documents — including complaints to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission against both appointed attorneys — while simultaneously requesting and then rejecting counsel on multiple occasions. The trial court’s record reflected at least five separate occasions on which Davidson requested to proceed pro se and received the full admonishments required under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth District affirmed Davidson’s sentence on the ground that he forfeited the pro se waiver issue on appeal. Illinois law requires a defendant to object at the time of the alleged error and to raise the issue in a postsentencing motion; Davidson failed to do so in a procedurally proper manner before the trial court retained jurisdiction. Although he filed an objection on May 20, 2024, the court had already been divested of jurisdiction by a previously filed notice of appeal, rendering that filing ineffective to preserve the issue.
On the second issue, the court held that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry. Davidson’s February 12, 2024, affidavit squarely raised pro se allegations of ineffective assistance by both Drummond and Poggenpohl. Under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny, a trial court is obligated to conduct a preliminary inquiry whenever a defendant raises such claims, to determine whether the allegations are meritless or potentially require appointment of new counsel. Because the trial court did not perform that inquiry, the case was remanded for that limited purpose.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant who fails to object at the time of the alleged pro se waiver error and does not raise the issue in a proper postsentencing motion forfeits the claim on appeal — repeated requests for counsel elsewhere in the record do not substitute for timely preservation.
- Under Krankel, a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry into any pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, even when the defendant’s posture toward appointed counsel has been combative or contradictory throughout the proceedings.
- Appointed counsel’s declination to adopt a defendant’s pro se postsentencing motion does not excuse the trial court from separately addressing colorable ineffective-assistance allegations raised in the defendant’s own filings.
- A notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction; objections filed after a notice of appeal is docketed cannot serve to preserve issues that were not already before the appellate court.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the procedural trap that can ensnare defendants who oscillate between self-representation and appointed counsel: the right to challenge a forced pro se proceeding is lost if the defendant does not preserve it through a timely objection and a proper postsentencing motion, regardless of how turbulent the representation history has been. Defense attorneys and trial courts alike should document each waiver with care and ensure postsentencing motions specifically preserve any claim that the defendant was improperly left unrepresented.
The remand on the Krankel issue underscores that the preliminary inquiry requirement is not discretionary. Even in cases where a defendant has repeatedly antagonized appointed counsel, filed disciplinary complaints against multiple attorneys, and vacillated on representation, the trial court must still pause to examine pro se ineffective-assistance allegations on their merits. Skipping that step — even in an understandably frustrating procedural history — is reversible error.