Background
Dana Lyvette Glenn owned a unit in Bradby Townhomes, a condominium development in Detroit operated by Bradby Townhomes Condominium Association. A long-running dispute over unpaid assessments led to a district court judgment against Glenn in June 2011. In October 2014, the parties executed a mutual release: Glenn paid $7,500 to satisfy the judgment, and the Association agreed to release her from all past, present, or future claims arising from assessments on the property. Notwithstanding the release, the Association continued to charge association dues and delinquent fees beginning in 2015, and Glenn continued making payments.
In November 2020, the Association filed a notice of lien on Glenn’s condominium for $2,364 in unpaid fees. By that time, Glenn had conveyed the unit to Trinity Village LLC, a company she solely owned and managed. When Trinity Village LLC attempted to sell the unit in July 2021, the outstanding lien required $6,000 to be held in escrow from the seller’s proceeds pending release of the lien, delaying the closing. Glenn paid the $2,364 lien balance in June 2021 and separately paid a $1,664 roofing assessment charged in July 2021, yet the lien was not promptly released.
Glenn filed suit in January 2023 asserting three claims: (1) breach of contract, arguing the 2014 mutual release barred the Association from charging any future assessments; (2) tortious interference with a business expectancy, contending the Association’s failure to release the lien disrupted the escrow agreement and sale; and (3) violation of the Michigan Condominium Act, MCL 559.101 et seq., based on the Association charging assessments against her unit. The trial court granted the Association summary disposition on all three claims and denied Glenn’s subsequent motion to amend her complaint and motion for reconsideration. Glenn appealed in propria persona.
The Court’s Holding
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition on all three claims. On the breach-of-contract claim, the court held it was barred by Michigan’s six-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5807(9). The claim accrued in 2015 when the Association first charged assessments after the release and Glenn made her first post-release payment—more than six years before she filed suit in January 2023. Glenn’s assertions that she did not receive the release until 2017 or that the Association demanded new terms were unsupported by evidence in the record.
On the tortious-interference claim, the court held Glenn failed to show the third essential element—an intentional interference by the defendant through affirmative acts corroborating an improper motive. The Association filed the November 2020 lien for an amount matching Glenn’s actual outstanding balance, was not a party to the escrow agreement, and Glenn presented no evidence the Association even knew of the escrow arrangement or ever expressly refused to release the lien. Collecting a legitimate debt through proper lien procedures does not constitute tortious interference.
On the Condominium Act claim, the court held Glenn identified no provision of the Association’s bylaws or the Act that the Association violated. The bylaws expressly authorized the Association to impose assessments and to collect unpaid amounts from a unit’s sale proceeds. Glenn’s contention that the roofing assessments were improper was unsupported by any specific bylaw provision she could point to. The court also rejected Glenn’s request for remand to file an amended complaint adding four new breach-of-contract claims, finding each futile—the wage-garnishment claim would be time-barred, and the three lien-based claims were legally insufficient because Glenn offered no evidence she ever requested lien releases that the Association refused.
Key Takeaways
- A breach-of-contract claim based on a mutual release accrues when the opposing party first fails to perform—here, when the Association began charging assessments in 2015—not when the plaintiff later discovers or contests the breach.
- To sustain a tortious-interference-with-business-expectancy claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence of specific affirmative acts by the defendant demonstrating an improper motive; filing a valid lien for a legitimate debt is insufficient without more.
- A Condominium Act claim requires identifying a specific provision of the bylaws or statute the association violated; broad allegations that charges were improper, without pointing to a governing provision, will not survive summary disposition.
- Proposed amendments to a complaint are futile—and may be denied without remand—when the added claims are facially time-barred or lack evidentiary support for an essential element such as damages or the defendant’s breach.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that mutual releases in condominium-assessment disputes are not perpetual shields against future obligations unless their language unambiguously so provides, and that courts will apply the accrual date strictly for limitations purposes. Attorneys advising condominium owners negotiating settlement releases should ensure the agreement’s scope—particularly whether it covers future as well as past assessments—is unambiguous, and should counsel clients to act promptly when an association continues charging fees post-release.
The case also illustrates the evidentiary burden required to sustain a tortious-interference claim against a condominium association that exercises its contractual lien rights. A mere allegation that a lien delayed a sale, without affirmative evidence of improper motive or an unjustified refusal to discharge, will not carry the day. For practitioners representing sellers in condominium transactions, the opinion highlights the practical importance of resolving lien disputes with the association before—rather than during—an escrow period.