Background
Rhonda B. Sturm filed suit in May 2025 against the Wicomico County Board of Education alleging that a male teacher at North Salisbury Elementary School sexually abused her while she was a student between 1967 and June 1971. She brought her claims under the Child Victims Act of 2023 (CVA), which eliminated all statutes of limitations for child sexual abuse actions. The alleged abuse predated July 1, 1971—the date on which the General Assembly first required county boards of education to procure comprehensive liability insurance, thereby creating the only mechanism through which such boards can satisfy tort judgments.
The Board moved to dismiss, asserting absolute sovereign immunity for conduct occurring before July 1, 1971, on the ground that no funding source existed to pay judgments arising from that period. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County denied the motion. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, relying on this Court’s 2003 decision in Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Department, which had established a broad rule that interlocutory orders denying immunity defenses are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari to resolve two questions: whether the Board could pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial under the collateral order doctrine, and whether the CVA effectively waived the Board’s sovereign immunity for pre-July 1, 1971 conduct.
The Court’s Holding
On the jurisdictional question, the Court held that orders denying a claim of complete sovereign immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, recognizing an exception to Dawkins. The Court reasoned that sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit—not merely from liability—and that only the General Assembly, not the courts, may waive it. Forcing a state agency to litigate to final judgment before obtaining review of a denied sovereign immunity claim would irretrievably destroy the very protection the immunity confers: the right not to be subject to suit at all. Applying that rule to deny immediate appeal would itself constitute a judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity, which the Court held was beyond its authority. The exception applies when the order presents a pure question of law and the other collateral order doctrine prongs are satisfied.
On the merits, the Court held that the Board retains sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims based on conduct occurring before July 1, 1971. An effective waiver of sovereign immunity requires two independent elements: (1) specific legislative authorization subjecting the State to suit, and (2) an appropriation of funds or authorization of an independent mechanism to pay judgments. The Court assumed without deciding that the CVA satisfied the first element by authorizing suits against county boards for pre-1971 conduct. However, the Court found the second element plainly unsatisfied: the General Assembly neither appropriated money to pay such judgments nor granted county boards any authority to raise funds for that purpose. The only payment mechanism ever provided—mandatory liability insurance—did not exist until July 1, 1971.
The Court reversed the Appellate Court’s dismissal of the appeal and remanded with instructions to direct the circuit court to grant the Board’s motion to dismiss without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- Orders denying complete sovereign immunity are immediately appealable under Maryland’s collateral order doctrine; Dawkins is overruled on this narrow point for state entities asserting full immunity from suit.
- A waiver of sovereign immunity requires both legislative authorization to sue and a funded payment mechanism; satisfying only the authorization prong is insufficient.
- The CVA’s elimination of time limits for child sexual abuse claims does not, standing alone, waive a county board of education’s sovereign immunity for conduct predating the 1971 insurance mandate—no funding vehicle exists to satisfy such judgments.
- The holding is expressly limited to claims of complete sovereign immunity; partial waivers (such as the existing $400,000 general liability coverage) do not qualify for immediate interlocutory appeal because the residual immunity is one from excess liability, not from suit itself.
Why It Matters
This decision has significant implications for CVA plaintiffs pursuing childhood sexual abuse claims against Maryland county school boards based on conduct from before July 1, 1971. By holding that the funding prong of the sovereign immunity waiver test remains unsatisfied for that era, the Court effectively forecloses such claims against boards absent further action by the General Assembly—either an appropriation or a new independent funding authorization. Survivors whose alleged abuse straddles the July 1, 1971 date will need to focus their claims on post-cutoff conduct, and even then only up to the applicable insurance limits.
More broadly, the Court’s collateral order ruling reshapes Maryland appellate practice for government defendants. State agencies and instrumentalities asserting complete sovereign immunity may now obtain immediate appellate review of adverse trial court rulings, rather than bearing the full burden and cost of litigation before the immunity question can be resolved. This procedural protection aligns Maryland with federal practice under the Eleventh Amendment and the approach of numerous other state courts.