Background
Bismark Boa-Bonsu and Deborah Owusu are the divorced parents of B.B., a child born in Finland in 2016. Their Finnish custody agreement granted joint custody with B.B. residing primarily with Owusu and Boa-Bonsu receiving biweekly visitation. The relationship between the parents remained contentious, with Owusu alleging a history of domestic abuse and Boa-Bonsu denying those claims. In March 2024, Boa-Bonsu sought Finnish social welfare assistance to enforce the custody agreement, prompting a scheduled mediation meeting for June 10, 2024.
Rather than attend the meeting, Owusu fled Finland with B.B. in June 2024 without notifying Boa-Bonsu. The two traveled through Mexico—B.B. later described entering the United States “from the jungle”—before settling in Columbus, Ohio, where Owusu moved in with a relative and became engaged to a new partner. Boa-Bonsu filed a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing federal statute, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), seeking B.B.’s return to Finland.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held a two-day evidentiary hearing in August 2025, during which both parents testified and the court conducted an in-camera interview of B.B., then approximately eight years old. The district court found that Owusu had wrongfully removed B.B. from Finland, rejected her defenses based on consent and grave risk of harm, but denied the petition on the ground that the Hague Convention’s age and maturity exception applied—B.B. was sufficiently mature and had clearly objected to returning.
The Court’s Holding
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error in the district court’s application of the age and maturity exception. The court reiterated that whether a child has attained sufficient maturity and whether the child objects to return are factual determinations reviewed for clear error, a standard that places a “serious thumb on the scale” for the district court and is especially deferential when the lower court directly observed a minor witness. The district court’s characterization of B.B. as “attentive, well-behaved, observant, and articulate” during his in-camera interview—contrasted with the unfavorable maturity findings that led to the opposite result in prior Sixth Circuit precedent—supported the maturity finding. The court rejected Boa-Bonsu’s argument that B.B.’s confusion about national borders, his reference to Mexico as “the jungle,” or his emotional state during the interview negated the maturity finding, noting those facts were orthogonal to the core inquiry: whether B.B. could interpret his own interests regarding return.
On the objection prong, the court held that B.B. had articulated particularized objections—not merely a general preference to remain—sufficient to satisfy the Convention. B.B. objected on three specific grounds: his loss of the Finnish language and the prospect of restarting school at the kindergarten level, his desire to remain near his soon-to-be-born sibling, and his concern that his father’s alcoholism meant he would not be adequately cared for in Finland. The court aligned with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in holding that the reasons for a child’s objection are immaterial so long as a genuine objection exists, and it rejected the argument that objections rooted in consequences of the wrongful removal itself should be categorically discounted—doing so, the court reasoned, would reduce the exception to a nullity.
The court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of Boa-Bonsu’s argument that Owusu’s coaching rendered B.B.’s objections unreliable. While acknowledging some evidence of maternal influence—B.B. admitted he sought his mother’s approval during his deposition and gave her a thumbs-up—the district court found the coaching evidence weak and the inconsistencies between B.B.’s deposition and in-camera interview not dispositive. The Sixth Circuit found no basis to disturb that credibility determination. Judge Nalbandian dissented, concluding that B.B.’s stated reasons reflected ordinary preferences rather than a cognizable objection under the Convention.
Key Takeaways
- There is no minimum age below which a child may be categorically deemed insufficiently mature under the Hague Convention’s age and maturity exception; the inquiry is fact-intensive and case-by-case, and district courts have substantial discretion after conducting in-camera interviews.
- A child’s particularized objections to return need not be grounded in disdain for the country of habitual residence; objections focused on educational disruption, family ties in the country of removal, or concerns about a parent’s fitness to care for the child can suffice.
- Objections that are partly a consequence of the wrongful removal itself—such as loss of language or formation of new family bonds—cannot be categorically discounted without effectively nullifying the exception.
- Appellate courts owe strong deference to district courts on both the maturity and objection determinations under clear-error review, particularly when those findings rest on the court’s direct observation of the child during an in-camera interview.
Why It Matters
This decision is an important published ruling on the outer boundaries of the Hague Convention’s age and maturity exception, a provision courts have struggled to apply consistently, especially for children under ten. By affirming that even an eight-year-old’s particularized objections can defeat a return petition—and that the reasons for those objections are immaterial—the Sixth Circuit aligns itself with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits and signals that district courts retain meaningful discretion to credit a young child’s stated wishes after a careful in-camera proceeding.
Practitioners handling international child abduction cases should note that the majority’s reasoning creates real tension with the Convention’s strong default presumption in favor of return to the country of habitual residence. The dissent’s concern—that nearly any child removed at a young age and living abroad for a year or more could manufacture qualifying “objections” rooted in the natural consequences of the removal—reflects a genuine circuit-level debate about how narrowly the exception should be construed. Defense and petitioner counsel alike should expect this decision to be cited in threshold maturity and objection disputes in Hague cases involving school-age children.