Background
Tricia Marie Myers, proceeding pro se, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Itasca County Housing and Redevelopment Authority (HRA) and three individual employees — Diane Larson, Carrie Schmitz, and Kenda Roddenberg — in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota before Judge John R. Tunheim. The underlying facts giving rise to the constitutional claims are not detailed in the unpublished opinion.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants and against Myers. Myers appealed, challenging both the district court’s reliance on a declaration submitted by defendant Diane Larson and the propriety of summary judgment overall.
The Court’s Holding
A per curiam panel of the Eighth Circuit — Judges Smith, Erickson, and Stras — affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The court held that the district court permissibly relied on Larson’s declaration, finding it satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4): it was based on personal knowledge, set out facts admissible in evidence, and demonstrated Larson’s competency to testify on the matters stated.
The court further concluded that summary judgment itself was proper under the standard of review set out in Lloyd v. FedLoan Servicing, 105 F.4th 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2024). The decision is unpublished and was issued pursuant to Eighth Circuit Rule 47B.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant’s declaration at summary judgment is permissible under Rule 56(c)(4) so long as it reflects personal knowledge, sets out admissible facts, and demonstrates the declarant’s competence to testify.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on all claims in this pro se § 1983 action without detailed discussion of the underlying constitutional merits, indicating the record plainly supported the defense.
- The opinion is unpublished and carries no precedential weight under Eighth Circuit rules.
Why It Matters
While unpublished and fact-specific, this decision reinforces that pro se § 1983 plaintiffs face the same evidentiary standards at summary judgment as represented parties. Defendants in civil rights suits against government entities and employees can defeat claims at the summary judgment stage through well-supported declarations meeting Rule 56(c)(4)’s requirements, even when the plaintiff challenges the admissibility of that evidence.
For housing authority employees and similar local government actors, the outcome underscores that individual declarations — when grounded in personal knowledge — remain a reliable vehicle for establishing the absence of a genuine factual dispute in § 1983 litigation.